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PLEA AGREEMENTS AS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTRACTS*
COLIN MILLER**
In his dissenting opinion in Ricketts v. Adamson, Justice
Brennan proposed the idea of plea agreements as constitutional
contracts and lamented the fact that the Supreme Court had yet to
set up rules of construction for resolving plea-deal disputes. Since
Adamson, courts have given lip service to Justice Brennan’s
dissent and applied his reasoning in piecemeal fashion. No court
or scholar, however, has attempted to define the extent to which a
plea agreement is a constitutional contract or develop rules of
construction to apply in plea-deal disputes. This gap is
concerning given that ninety-five percent of criminal cases are
resolved by plea agreements.
This Article is the first attempt to defend the concept of plea
agreements as constitutional contracts and establish a core rule of
construction to guide judges in interpreting plea bargains. It
advances the thesis that due process requires that courts treat
pleading defendants at least as well as parties to other contracts,
meaning all of the protections associated with contract law
should be incorporated into plea-bargaining law through the
Due Process Clause.
This Article then argues that incorporation of one of these
protections—the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing—would lead to legal reform in three plea-bargaining
scenarios where pleading defendants are treated worse than
parties to other contracts: (1) substantial assistance motions, (2)
Brady disclosures, and (3) prosecutorial presentation of
sentencing recommendations.
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INTRODUCTION
In his 1987 dissenting opinion in Ricketts v. Adamson,1 Justice
Brennan proposed the idea of plea agreements as constitutional
contracts:
This Court has yet to address in any comprehensive way the
rules of construction appropriate for disputes involving plea
agreements. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the law of
commercial contract may in some cases prove useful as an
analogy or point of departure in construing a plea agreement,
or in framing the terms of the debate.2
In the thirty years since Adamson, courts have given lip service
to Justice Brennan’s dissent and applied his reasoning in piecemeal
fashion in cases involving disputes over plea bargains. No court or
scholar, however, has ever attempted to develop clear rules of
construction to apply in plea-bargaining disputes. This gap in the law
is surprising and concerning given that approximately ninety-five
percent of criminal cases in this country are now resolved by plea
agreements.3
This Article is the first attempt to establish a core rule of
construction to guide judges in interpreting plea bargains. It advances
the thesis that due process requires that courts treat pleading
defendants at least as well as parties to other contracts, meaning that
all of the protections associated with contract law should be
incorporated into plea-bargaining law through the Due Process
Clause. This Article then argues that incorporation of one of these
contract law protections—the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing—would lead to legal reform in three key plea-bargaining
scenarios where pleading defendants are treated worse than parties to
other contracts.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I of this Article
provides a brief history of plea bargaining. Part II analyzes Justice
Brennan’s dissent and advances the theory of plea agreements as

1. 483 U.S. 1 (1987).
2. Id. at 16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3. State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Iowa 2013).
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constitutional contracts. Finally, Part III argues that this theory would
result in substantial reform to three key plea-bargaining scenarios: (1)
substantial assistance motions, (2) Brady disclosures, and (3)
prosecutorial presentation of sentencing recommendations.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING
In the United States, “plea bargaining did not occur with any
frequency until well into the nineteenth century.”4 Toward the end of
the nineteenth century and through the beginning of the twentieth
century, plea bargaining became “a dominant method of resolving
criminal cases” at the same time that there was a substantive
expansion of criminal law.5 In the decades following the 1920s, plea
bargaining became an even more central part of the criminal justice
system, despite disapproval by scholars and the press.6
The major reason for this disapproval was the fact that plea
bargaining occurred in an informal and clandestine manner.7 There
was “a ritual of denial that any promises ha[d] been made, a ritual in
which judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel . . . participated.”8 As
a result, there was “a lack of effective judicial review of the propriety
of the agreements, thus increasing the risk of real or apparent
unfairness.”9
The first attempt to regulate plea bargaining came in 1946, when
Congress promulgated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.10 At
the time, Rule 11 simply stated that a judge should not accept a guilty
plea “without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily with
understanding of the nature of the charge.”11 In 1966, the Supreme
Court amended Rule 11 to prohibit a judge from accepting a guilty
plea “without first addressing the defendant personally and
determining the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the
nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.”12
Despite the Supreme Court’s amendment to Rule 11, the Court
itself noted that it was not until its 1971 opinion in Santobello v. New
4. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5
(1979).
5. Id. at 6. This expansion was largely the result of Prohibition. Id.
6. Id.
7. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to 1974 amendment.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (1946) (amended 1966); see also State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d
46, 51 (Iowa 2013).
11. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (1946) (amended 1966).
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (1966) (amended 1974).
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York13 “that lingering doubts about the legitimacy of the practice
were finally dispelled.”14 In Santobello, the Court recognized that
there would need to be a significant expansion in the number of
judges and court facilities if every criminal charge were taken to
trial.15 Therefore, the Court concluded that “[t]he disposition of
criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the
accused, sometimes loosely called ‘plea bargaining,’ is an essential
component of the administration of justice.”16 As such, “[p]roperly
administered, it is to be encouraged.”17
Since Santobello, plea bargaining has become the predominant
method of resolving criminal charges in this country. Currently, about
ninety-five percent of criminal cases that are not dismissed are
resolved with plea bargains.18 This shift to plea bargaining has led
scholars to bemoan the death of the jury trial.19
II. PLEA AGREEMENTS AS CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACTS
The 1987 Supreme Court case Ricketts v. Adamson highlighted
the fact that there have never been rules of construction created for
plea agreements, but it did not define the extent to which commercial
contract law informs plea-bargaining law. Nonetheless, subsequent
precedent, including Supreme Court precedent, makes clear that
defendants entering into plea agreements should be treated at least as
well as parties entering into commercial contracts.
In Adamson, the Supreme Court was given the opportunity to
determine the extent to which the Constitution informs the question
of whether the prosecution breached a plea agreement. A majority of
the Court, however, failed to answer the question.
A. Ricketts v. Adamson
In Ricketts v. Adamson, a reporter for the Arizona Republic was
killed when a dynamite bomb exploded under his car, and the State
charged John Adamson with first-degree murder in connection with

13. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
14. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977) (discussing the holding of Santobello,
which established the necessity of the practice of plea bargaining).
15. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Iowa 2013).
19. See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding, Due Process Without Judicial Process?:
Antiadversarialism in American Legal Culture, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2249, 2249 (2017).
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the crime.20 Adamson later entered into a plea agreement, pursuant
to which he pleaded guilty to second-degree murder in exchange for
his testimony against Max Dunlap and James Robison, who were also
allegedly involved in the murder.21 Specifically, the plea deal stated in
relevant part that “[s]hould the defendant refuse to testify or should
he at any time testify untruthfully . . . then this entire agreement is
null and void and the original charge will be automatically
reinstated.”22
Adamson thereafter testified against the two other men, who
were convicted of first-degree murder.23 Pursuant to the plea
agreement, the court then sentenced Adamson to 48 to 49 years’
imprisonment, “with a total incarceration time of 20 years and 2
months.”24 On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Arizona
reversed the convictions of Dunlap and Robison based upon
Confrontation Clause violations.25
Before retrial, the State informed Adamson that it intended to
call him as a witness against the two men pursuant to his plea
agreement.26 Defense counsel responded by sending a letter to the
prosecutor indicating that Adamson believed his obligations under
the plea agreement ended when he was sentenced.27 The State
countered with its own letter stating that it believed Adamson to be in
breach of his plea agreement.28 When the State thereafter called
Adamson to testify at a pretrial proceeding in connection with the
retrial of Dunlap and Robison, defense counsel told the judge about
the prosecutor’s letter.29 As a result, the judge did not compel
Adamson to answer the prosecutor’s questions at the proceeding.30
The State followed up by filing a new first-degree murder charge
against Adamson, who moved to quash the charge on double
jeopardy grounds.31 The Supreme Court of Arizona eventually found
that (1) Adamson breached the plea agreement, which contemplated
his testimony at “retrial after reversal”; and (2) Adamson waived his
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 3 (1987).
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
State v. Dunlap, 608 P.2d 41, 44 (Ariz. 1980); see also Adamson, 483 U.S. at 4.
Adamson, 483 U.S. at 4.
Id. at 4–5.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
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double jeopardy objection under the terms of the plea agreement.32
That said, the court concluded that the prosecution should have
reinstated the initial first-degree murder charge rather than bringing a
new first-degree murder charge; therefore, it remanded the case after
it vacated Adamson’s second-degree murder conviction, reinstated
the original first-degree murder charge, and dismissed the new firstdegree murder charge.33 At this point, Adamson offered to testify
against Dunlap and Robison, but the prosecutor declined the offer.34
Adamson was later convicted of first-degree murder and given the
death penalty.35
His appeal eventually reached the United States Supreme Court,
which initially noted that “[u]nder the terms of the plea agreement,
both parties bargained for and received substantial benefits.”36 The
Court then found that the agreement made clear that Adamson
“would have no double jeopardy defense” if he failed to hold up his
end of the bargain.37 Because the United States Supreme Court
agreed with its Arizona counterpart that Adamson breached the plea
agreement, it found that he was not entitled to relief.38
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens, Justice Brennan began by noting that the entire case
hinged on whether Adamson breached the plea agreement.39 He then
used the following language:
This Court has yet to address in any comprehensive way the
rules of construction appropriate for disputes involving plea
agreements. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the law of
commercial contract may in some cases prove useful as an
analogy or point of departure in construing a plea agreement,
or in framing the terms of the debate. It is also clear, however,
that commercial contract law can do no more than this, because
plea agreements are constitutional contracts. The values that
underlie commercial contract law, and that govern the relations
between economic actors, are not coextensive with those that
underlie the Due Process Clause, and that govern relations
between criminal defendants and the State. Unlike some

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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commercial contracts, plea agreements must be construed in
light of the rights and obligations created by the Constitution.40
Justice Brennan next observed that both the Arizona and United
States Supreme Courts merely assumed that Adamson breached the
plea deal without analyzing the facts under commercial contract law.41
He then argued that Adamson’s letter could not be a regular breach
because the plea deal did not require Adamson to agree with the
State’s interpretation of the plea agreement or refrain from sending
such a letter.42 Further, Justice Brennan found that the letter was not
an anticipatory breach of the plea deal because it merely advanced an
alternative reasonable interpretation of the agreement and did not
state a refusal to perform.43
Justice Brennan determined that the majority’s opinion finding
Adamson in breach was especially problematic because, “far from
being a commercial actor, Adamson is an individual whose
‘contractual’ relation with the State is governed by the
Constitution.”44 Therefore, “[t]he determination of Adamson’s rights
and responsibilities under the plea agreement is controlled by the
principles of fundamental fairness imposed by the Due Process
Clause.”45 As a result, granting “one party—here, the State—the
unilateral and exclusive right to define the meaning of a plea
agreement is patently unfair.”46
Finally, Justice Brennan concluded that even if Adamson
breached the plea agreement, the State had the duty, like a party to a
commercial contract, to “take all reasonable steps to minimize the
consequent damage.”47 According to Justice Brennan, while
Adamson’s actions might have delayed the retrials of Dunlap and
Robison and cost the State some litigation expenses, Adamson was
now prepared to fulfill his end of the bargain.48 Therefore, the State
could have been made whole by accepting Adamson’s testimony and
exacting some minor penalty on Adamson, but a capital murder
prosecution was too steep of a price.49 Justice Brennan found that (1)
40. Id. at 16 (citation omitted) (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.6
(1977)).
41. Id. at 16–17.
42. Id. at 17.
43. Id. at 18.
44. Id. at 20.
45. Id. at 20–21.
46. Id. at 21.
47. Id. at 22.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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“[a] comparable result in commercial law, if one could be imagined,
would not be enforced”;50 and (2) “[t]he fundamental unfairness in
the State’s course of conduct here is even less acceptable under the
Constitution.”51
Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion laid the groundwork for the
concept of plea agreements as constitutional contracts. And yet,
neither the Supreme Court nor lower courts have fleshed out the
groundwork in the ensuing decades.
B.

Subsequent Case Law on Plea Agreements as Constitutional
Contracts

Given that Justice Brennan’s conclusion that “plea agreements
are constitutional contracts” came in a dissenting opinion,52 it is
unsurprising that most courts have not explicitly cited it in their
opinions. Two federal circuit courts have cited this language from
Justice Brennan’s dissent: the Third Circuit, in a dissenting opinion,53
and the First Circuit, in noting that the defendant had not claimed
prosecutorial breach.54 Three federal district courts have quoted the
language as well, all in unpublished opinions.55 Finally, a handful of
state courts have cited Justice Brennan’s dissent to find in favor of
defendants.56
While most courts have not explicitly cited Justice Brennan’s
conclusion, the Supreme Court and all federal circuit courts,57 along

50. Id. at 23.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 16.
53. McKeever v. Warden SCI-Graterford, 486 F.3d 81, 97 (3d Cir. 2007) (Roth, J.,
dissenting).
54. United States v. Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d 209, 235 (1st Cir. 1989), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Rivera-Feliciano v. United States, 498 U.S. 954 (1990).
55. See Hughes v. Beard, No. 14-cv-01302-EMC, 2016 WL 126931, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 12, 2016); Holston v. Cate, No. 2:11-CV-00917-JKS, 2012 WL 6561729, at *6 (E.D.
Cal. Dec. 14, 2012); United States v. Bell, Criminal Action No. H-07-271, 2008 WL 59188,
at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2008).
56. See, e.g., Smith v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 742, 744 (Ky. 2013); State v. Louis,
645 So. 2d 1144, 1148 (La. 1994).
57. See Cuero v. Cate, 827 F.3d 879, 885 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 4 (2017);
United States v. Villa-Vazquez, 536 F.3d 1189, 1199 (10th Cir. 2008); McKeever, 486 F.3d
at 97 (Roth, J., dissenting); United States v. Debreczeny, 69 F. App’x 702, 706 (6th Cir.
2003); San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1075 (11th Cir. 1996); Margalli-Olvera v.
INS, 43 F.3d 345, 351 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Martin, 25 F.3d 211, 216–17 (4th Cir.
1994); United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v.
Pelletier, 898 F.2d 297, 301–02 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Ataya, 864 F.2d 1324, 1329
(7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Papaleo, 853 F.2d 16, 18–19 (1st Cir. 1988); In re Geisser,
627 F.2d 745, 749 (5th Cir. 1980).
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with state supreme courts across the country,58 have found that plea
agreements are governed or strongly influenced by contract law, with
defendants also afforded the additional protection of the Due Process
Clause.
In its 2009 opinion in Puckett v. United States,59 the Supreme
Court held that, “[a]lthough the analogy may not hold in all respects,
plea bargains are essentially contracts.”60 According to the Court,
under commercial law, “[w]hen the consideration for a contract
fails—that is, when one of the exchanged promises is not kept—we do
not say that the voluntary bilateral consent to the contract never
existed, so that it is automatically and utterly void; we say that the
contract was broken.”61 The Court applied this same analysis to plea
agreements by analogy to commercial contract law, concluding that
“it is hornbook law that misrepresentation requires an intent at the
time of contracting not to perform.”62
The Supreme Court is not alone. Courts across the country
frequently apply commercial contract law principles to plea
bargaining. For instance, “[c]ourts have generally considered contract
defenses like unclean hands and lack of meeting of the minds in
evaluating whether a plea agreement should be voided.”63 Courts
have also applied the commercial contract law doctrines of mutual
mistake of fact64 and frustration of purpose65 to void plea agreements
and discharge the parties’ obligations under such agreements.
Moreover, because it is the Due Process Clause that mandates
the prosecution’s performance,66 many courts have placed a greater
degree of responsibility on the government than they place upon
criminal defendants and/or parties to private contracts. For instance,
in United States v. Harvey,67 Michael Lee Harvey was charged with
nine offenses related to drug smuggling and distribution operations.68
Harvey subsequently pleaded guilty to one charge in exchange for the
prosecution dropping the remaining charges and agreeing to the
58. See, e.g., Ex parte Johnson, 669 So. 2d 205, 207 (Ala. 1995); In re Lord, 94 P.3d
952, 955 (Wash. 2004).
59. 556 U.S. 129 (2009).
60. Id. at 137.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 138 n.1.
63. Boswell v. Crews, No. 3:11cv352/RV/EMT, 2013 WL 1562940, at *20 (N.D. Fla.
Feb. 25, 2013).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 381 F.3d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 2004).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Bunner, 134 F.3d 1000, 1004–05 (10th Cir. 1998).
66. Ex parte Johnson, 669 So. 2d 205, 207 (Ala. 1995).
67. 791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1986).
68. Id. at 295.
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following clause: “The Eastern District of Virginia further agrees not
to prosecute MICHAEL LEE HARVEY for any other possible
violations of criminal law arising from the offenses set out in the
indictment or the investigation giving rise to those charges.”69
Later, Harvey was indicted in connection with the same crimes in
the District of South Carolina, and he moved in the Eastern District
of Virginia for enforcement of the plea agreement and enjoinment of
the South Carolina indictment.70 The Fourth Circuit agreed with
Harvey, finding that the language was ambiguous as to whether the
subject clause applied only in the Eastern District of Virginia or
everywhere.71
In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit held that “both
constitutional and supervisory concerns require holding the
Government to a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant
(or possibly than would be either of the parties to commercial
contracts) for imprecisions or ambiguities in plea agreements.”72 This
language about possibly holding the prosecution to a higher standard
than parties to a commercial contract has proven to be pretty popular.
It has since been cited by four other federal circuit courts,73 four state
supreme courts,74 and several federal district courts.75
In addition to numerous courts applying Harvey, several courts
have also found that defendants may be entitled to relief, even when
prosecutors do not violate specific terms of plea agreements, due to
“general principles of due process and prosecutorial responsibility.”76
Additionally, courts have concluded that due process sometimes
requires courts to deviate from normal contract law to provide further
protection to criminal defendants entering into plea agreements.77
Finally, courts have refused to apply some contract law principles
to plea bargaining to protect the constitutional rights of defendants,
69. Id. at 295–96, 296 n.1.
70. Id. at 297.
71. Id. at 303.
72. Id. at 300.
73. See United States v. Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101, 1106 (11th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Clark, 218 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 399
(6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Giorgi, 840 F.2d 1022, 1026–27 (1st Cir. 1988).
74. See People v. McClellan, 862 P.2d 739, 750–51 (Cal. 1993) (en banc); Cole v. State,
922 A.2d 364, 377 (Del. 2007); State v. Langley, 369 P.3d 1005, 1010 (Mont. 2016); State v.
Bisson, 130 P.3d 820, 828 (Wash. 2006) (en banc).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Oruche, 257 F. Supp. 2d 230, 239 (D.D.C. 2003).
76. See, e.g., State v. Tyson, 189 N.C. App. 408, 416, 658 S.E.2d 285, 291 (2008).
77. See, e.g., McKeever v. Warden SCI-Graterford, 486 F.3d 81, 86 (3d Cir. 2007);
United States v. Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 1990); Loveless v. State, 896 N.E.2d
918, 921 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
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which seems consistent with the Puckett Court’s conclusion that the
analogy between contract law and plea-bargain law may not hold in
all respects.78 For example, in United States v. Barron,79 William Scott
Barron, Jr. entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which he
pleaded guilty to several crimes, including possession of a firearm in
relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1).80 Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that a defendant
violates § 924(c)(1) only by “active employment” of a firearm in
relation to a drug trafficking crime.81 Because Barron did not actively
employ a firearm in his crime, he moved to set aside his conviction.82
The government responded that the commercial contract principle of
mutual mistake of law required rescission of the entire plea
agreement.83
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, concluding that
[a] plea bargain is not a commercial exchange. It is an
instrument for the enforcement of the criminal law. What is at
stake for the defendant is his liberty . . . . The interests at stake
and the judicial context in which they are weighed require that
something more than contract law be applied.84
The Ninth Circuit then noted that it had decided not to use the
doctrine of mutual mistake of law to invalidate plea bargains in past
cases before reaching the same conclusion in the case at hand.85
While courts have mostly treated criminal defendants the same
as or better than parties to normal contracts, there are exceptions. For
instance, in Berryhill v. United States,86 the defendant sought to have
his plea agreement voided because, inter alia, it was a contract of
adhesion with the government not giving up anything of value.87 In
response, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio acknowledged that contract law principles apply when a
defendant claims that the government breached a plea agreement.88
But the court noted that the defendant was trying to rescind portions
of his plea agreement and concluded that “application of contract
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009).
172 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1155.
Id. at 1156 (quoting Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995)).
Id.
Id. at 1158.
Id.
Id. at 1158–59.
No. 1:15-cv-815, 2016 WL 2610258 (N.D. Ohio May 6, 2016).
Id. at *7.
Id.
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principles to plea agreements does not extend so far as to allow courts
to determine whether a contract was formed.”89
Lower courts have also, in some cases, refused to import specific
commercial contract law doctrines into plea bargaining. In Anderson
v. Wainwright,90 the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida concluded that “a variant of promissory estoppel is
not available to prevent an invalid plea proceeding from being a
nullity, without legal effect.”91 Similarly, in State v. Smith,92 the Court
of Appeals of Ohio denied a defendant relief because he was not able
to cite “any authority applying the equitable doctrines of unjust
enrichment or promissory estoppel in the context of an attempted
plea agreement.”93 And, in State v. Reed,94 the Court of Appeals of
Washington concluded, “[W]e do not believe the panoply of contract
law can be appropriately transported, in toto, into criminal law” and
thus doubted that “[c]ontract law doctrines such as severability,
impracticability and quantum meruit” apply in the plea-bargaining
context.95 Case law from jurisdictions around the country has created
confusion and inconsistency as to the scope of plea bargains as
constitutional contracts.
C.

Plea-Bargaining Criminal Defendants Should Be Treated at Least
as Well as Parties to Other Government Contracts

If plea agreements are constitutional contracts, we need to
address the extent to which contract law informs plea-bargaining law.
In other words, to the extent we have established that the Due
Process Clause applies to plea bargaining, we next need to establish
“what process is due.”96 This Article proposes that the Due Process
Clause requires that courts treat pleading defendants at least as well
as parties to other contracts, and specifically government contracts.
Again, this should be a relatively palatable proposal, at least in
the abstract. As noted, courts across the country have cited the
Fourth Circuit’s conclusion in Harvey that “both constitutional and
supervisory concerns require holding the Government to a greater
degree of responsibility than the defendant (or possibly than would
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
446 F. Supp. 763 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
Id. at 765.
No. 2009-CA-81, 2010 WL 5276934 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2010).
Id. at *16 n.1.
879 P.2d 1000 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 1002.
See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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be either of the parties to commercial contracts) for imprecisions or
ambiguities in plea agreements.”97 Also, as noted, courts sometimes
treat criminal defendants better than parties to commercial law
contracts by refusing to apply certain commercial contract law
doctrines, like mutual mistake of law, that could harm pleading
defendants.98 Additionally, as the Seventh Circuit concluded in United
States v. Cook,99 “A defendant who has signed a plea agreement has
all the defenses he would have under contract law, plus some.”100
However, as noted previously,101 and as will be discussed
further,102 there are certain specific situations where courts treat
pleading defendants worse than parties to other contracts, including
government contracts. This treatment runs counter to the way that
courts typically treat criminal defendants. Courts often use the Due
Process Clause to confer greater rights upon criminal defendants than
civil litigants. For instance, the Due Process Clause allows criminal
defendants to present evidence that civil defendants could not
introduce based upon the rape-shield rule.103 Moreover, the Due
Process Clause is part of the rationale for a criminal defendant’s right
to present a defense,104 which can trump the Federal Rules of
Evidence in criminal, but not civil, cases.105
Indeed, the common question for courts is the extent to which
they need to use the Due Process Clause to extend criminal
safeguards to civil and quasi-criminal litigants. In a trilogy of cases,
the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause gives criminal
defendants greater or equal rights than those given to civil litigants
and can be used to determine which due process protections in
criminal cases need to be imported into civil and quasi-criminal cases.
The keystone case on the issue is Mathews v. Eldridge.106 In
Eldridge, George Eldridge was awarded Social Security disability
benefits in June 1968.107 In 1972, Eldridge indicated in a questionnaire
that his condition had not improved, but the state agency monitoring
97. United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986); see also supra text
accompanying notes 73–75.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 78–85.
99. 406 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2005).
100. Id. at 487–88.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 86–95.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 246–66, 428–50.
103. See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C); State v. Lake, 686 A.2d 510, 515–16 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1996) (quoting State v. Cassidy, 489 A.2d 386, 390 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985)).
104. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986).
105. See, e.g., Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006).
106. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
107. Id. at 323.
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Eldridge’s condition preliminarily determined that his eligibility for
benefits had ceased.108 The agency informed Eldridge that he could
submit additional information pertaining to his condition, but he
declined.109 Therefore, the agency made a final determination that
Eldridge was no longer disabled, and the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) accepted that determination.110 The SSA
notified Eldridge that he had six months to seek reconsideration, but
he instead filed a lawsuit challenging the administrative procedures,
which did not entitle him to an evidentiary hearing.111
That lawsuit eventually reached the Supreme Court, which laid
out the three factors it considers in determining the amount of
process due to a litigant:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.112
Applying these three factors, the Court concluded that Eldridge was
not entitled to a hearing.113
In Morrissey v. Brewer,114 which actually predated Eldridge, the
Supreme Court reached a different result using a similar analysis.115 In
Morrissey, two men were paroled after serving part of their
sentences.116 Both men were subsequently arrested and had their
parole revoked based solely upon parole officers’ reports and without
parole revocation hearings.117 They then appealed, claiming that due
process required a hearing.118
Those appeals reached the Supreme Court, which began by
noting “that the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal
prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 323–24.
Id. at 324.
Id.
See id. at 324–25.
Id. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263–71 (1970)).
Id. at 349.
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
Id. at 490.
Id. at 472–73.
Id.
Id. at 474.
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such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations.”119 According
to the Court, this is because “[p]arole arises after the end of the
criminal prosecution, including imposition of sentence.”120
The Court then proceeded to consider the three factors later
crystalized in Eldridge. Under factor one, the private interest at stake,
the Court found that a parolee has an interest in his continued liberty
that is tempered by conditions of his parole that “subject[] him to
many restrictions not applicable to other citizens.”121 Therefore, a
parolee’s private interest is not much weaker than the private interest
of a criminal defendant because “the liberty of a parolee, although
indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified
liberty.”122
Jumping to the third factor, the Court found that the prior
conviction and imposition of conditions on a parolee creates “an
overwhelming [government] interest in being able to return the
individual to imprisonment without the burden of a new adversary
criminal trial if in fact he has failed to abide by the conditions of his
parole.”123 That said, under the second factor, the Court concluded
that there is a serious risk of erroneous deprivation of a parolee’s
liberty interest without a hearing because parole boards might
otherwise rely upon incomplete or incorrect facts.124
Balancing these factors, the Court concluded that the State has
no interest in revoking parole without at least some informal
procedural guarantees.125 On the other hand, the Court found that
there is no need for formalism in the parole-revocation context.126
Therefore, the Court concluded that due process requires an informal
parole revocation hearing to ensure a decision is based upon verified
facts.127
The Court reached a similar conclusion in its post-Eldridge
opinion in Addington v. Texas.128 In Addington, Texas applied a
preponderance of the evidence standard to civil commitment
proceedings, and a committed individual appealed and claimed that
the State should be required to prove the need for commitment
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 480 (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 136 (1967)).
Id.
Id. at 481–82.
Id. at 482.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 483–84.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 487–88.
441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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beyond a reasonable doubt.129 The Supreme Court found that a civil
commitment is not as serious as a criminal conviction,130 but it also
found that such a commitment constitutes a serious deprivation of
liberty.131 As a result, the Court split the difference between the
parties’ positions and declared that the State must prove the need for
civil commitment by clear and convincing evidence.132
Some courts hold that this same standard of proof applies in
criminal commitment cases,133 while other courts require the
government to prove the need for criminal commitment beyond a
reasonable doubt.134 Similarly, many courts find that greater due
process protections apply in criminal contempt cases than those that
apply in civil contempt cases.135
Such differential treatment can also be seen in connection with
the one Supreme Court case applying the Eldridge three-factor test to
a criminal defendant. In Ake v. Oklahoma,136 Glen Ake, an indigent
defendant, was charged with murdering a couple and injuring their
children.137 The trial court initially declared Ake incompetent to stand
trial but changed its decision after he received an antipsychotic
drug.138 Defense counsel then indicated that Ake would raise an
insanity defense and claimed that the Constitution required the State
to arrange for a psychiatrist to examine Ake or provide funds so that
the defense could arrange its own examination.139 The court
disagreed, no examination was done, and Ake was ultimately
convicted and sentenced to die.140
On appeal, the Supreme Court applied Eldridge’s three-factor
test to determine whether the State has to provide an indigent
defendant with access to psychiatric assistance.141 The Court quickly
concluded under factor one that “[t]he private interest in the accuracy

129. Id. at 421.
130. Id. at 428.
131. Id. at 425.
132. Id. at 433.
133. See, e.g., State v. Rotherham, 923 P.2d 1131, 1148 (N.M. 1996).
134. See, e.g., State v. Paradis, 455 A.2d 1070, 1073 (N.H. 1983).
135. See, e.g., Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 775 F.2d 1440, 1451 n.9 (11th Cir. 1985)
(citing United States v. Vague, 697 F.2d 805, 808 (7th Cir. 1983)).
136. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
137. Id. at 70.
138. Id. at 71–72.
139. See id. at 72.
140. See id. at 72–73.
141. See id. at 77 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
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of a criminal proceeding that places an individual’s life or liberty at
risk is almost uniquely compelling.”142
Under factor three, the Court turned aside the State’s claim that
providing psychiatric assistance would be financially burdensome,
noting that several states and the federal government already do so
without issue.143 The Court then found that “it is difficult to identify
any interest of the State, other than that in its economy, that weighs
against recognition of this right.”144 This is because “[t]he State’s
interest in prevailing at trial—unlike that of a private litigant—is
necessarily tempered by its interest in the fair and accurate
adjudication of criminal cases.”145 Moreover, “also unlike a private
litigant, a State may not legitimately assert an interest in maintenance
of a strategic advantage over the defense, if the result of that
advantage is to cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict obtained.”146
Finally, with regard to factor two, the Court began by noting “the
pivotal role that psychiatry has come to play in criminal
proceedings.”147 The Court then found that the assistance of a
psychiatrist may be crucial for the jury to be able “to make a sensible
and educated determination about the mental condition of the
defendant at the time of the offense.”148 Therefore, the Court
concluded that an indigent defendant has a due process right of access
to the services of a competent psychiatrist if he can make a threshold
showing that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his
defense.149 Notably, courts have not extended this right to civil
cases.150 For example, in Goetz v. Crosson,151 the Second Circuit
declined to extend this right to civil cases because “a civil
commitment proceeding can in no sense be equated to a criminal
prosecution.”152
All of these cases support the following conclusions: (1) the Due
Process Clause gives criminal defendants greater or equal rights than
those given to civil litigants, and (2) courts use the Eldridge factors to
142. Id. at 78.
143. Id. at 78 & n.4.
144. Id. at 79.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 81.
149. Id. at 83.
150. See, e.g., In re Williams, 478 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (citing Ake, 470
U.S. at 76–86).
151. 967 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
152. Id. at 33 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979)).

97 N.C. L. REV. 31 (2018)

2018]

PLEA AGREEMENTS

49

determine when the due process protections in criminal cases need to
be imported in whole or in part to civil and quasi-criminal cases. It
logically follows from these two conclusions that the Due Process
Clause can and should be used, at a minimum, to import each of the
protections of civil contract law into the criminal plea-bargaining
process. Again, in the abstract, this proposal should not be too
controversial, given that courts across the country have found that
plea agreements are governed or strongly influenced by contract law,
with defendants also afforded the additional protection of the Due
Process Clause.153
When it gets to specifics, however, it appears that there are at
least three significant aspects of the plea-bargaining process where
most courts treat pleading criminal defendants worse than their civil
counterparts. The final part of this Article explains how importation
of a contract law doctrine into the plea-bargaining process would
level the playing field and afford pleading defendants additional due
process protections.
III. PLEA AGREEMENTS AS CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACTS AND THE
IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
In his dissenting opinion in Ricketts v. Adamson, Justice Brennan
proposed the idea of plea agreements as constitutional contracts and
lamented the fact that the Supreme Court had “yet to address in any
comprehensive way the rules of construction appropriate for disputes
involving plea agreements.”154 Under this Article’s theory of plea
agreements as constitutional contracts, the Due Process Clause
requires that pleading defendants be treated at least as well as parties
to other contracts, and specifically government contracts. At a
minimum, this means that every contract defense and rule of
construction that applies in the civil contract law context should apply
to the extent that it would assist pleading criminal defendants. The
remainder of this Article assesses one rule of construction—the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing—and explains how
applying it in the plea-bargaining process would cause significant
changes to the way that courts treat (1) substantial assistance motions,
(2) Brady disclosures, and (3) prosecutorial presentation of
sentencing recommendations.

153. See supra text accompanying notes 57–58.
154. Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 16 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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A. Origin of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The 1905 opinion of the Court of Appeals of New York in
Industrial & General Trust v. Tod155 contains the first significant
mention of an implied contractual duty of good faith in American
law.156 In Tod, New York’s highest court concluded that
[n]o one can be made by contract the final judge of his own
acts, for the law writes “good faith” into such agreements. No
covenant of immunity can be drawn that will protect a person
who acts in bad faith, because such a stipulation is against
public policy, and the courts will not enforce it. The law
requires the exercise of good faith, and, no matter how strong
the provision to shield from liability may be, there is no
protection unless good faith is observed.157
Twenty-eight years later, the New York Court of Appeals fully
fleshed out this analysis, creating what is now known as the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul
Armstrong Co.,158 playwright Paul Armstrong wrote Alias Jimmy
Valentine, a dramatization of O. Henry’s novel, A Retrieved
Reformation.159 Then, in 1921, the Paul Armstrong Company entered
into a theatrical licensing agreement with the Kirke La Shelle
Company (“La Shelle”), pursuant to which the latter company would
receive one-half of the money taken in from theatrical productions of
the play.160 Subsequently, in 1928, the Paul Armstrong Company sold
the motion picture rights to Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Corporation and
refused to pay La Shelle royalties connected to the sale.161 As a result,
La Shelle brought a breach of contract action, claiming that “the
contract with Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Corporation was a contract that
would affect the production of the play.”162
An intermediate appellate court denied La Shelle relief, finding
that motion pictures were an unknown quantity at the time of
contract formation, meaning that the court could not extend the
contract to cover royalties connected to this new medium.163 The
155. 73 N.E. 7 (N.Y. 1905).
156. Douglas D. Choe, Note, Vylene Enterprises v. Naugles: Remedies for Franchisor
Encroachment, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 353, 363 (1997).
157. Tod, 73 N.E. at 9.
158. 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933).
159. Id. at 164.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 166.
163. Id. at 165–66.
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state’s highest court, however, disagreed, concluding that, by entering
into a contract, the parties assumed a fiduciary relationship that
created a duty to act with the utmost good faith.164 Specifically, the
court found that
in every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party
shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or
injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the
contract, which means that in every contract there exists an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.165
Applying this implied covenant to the case at hand, the court
determined that “there was an implied obligation on the part of the
[Paul Armstrong Company] not to render valueless the right
conferred by the contract.”166 Therefore, even though the defendant
did not violate an express contractual term, it violated the duty
created by the implied covenant and breached the contract.167
B.

The Modern Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Currently, section 1-304 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(“U.C.C.”), which governs many commercial contracts, states that
“[e]very contract or duty within [the U.C.C.] imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance and enforcement.”168 Courts across the
country have found that this section is a codification of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.169
Similarly, section 205 of the Second Restatement of Contracts,
which applies to non-U.C.C. contracts, provides that “[e]very contract
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement.”170 The Supreme Court recently
cited this language in its 2010 opinion in Alabama v. North
Carolina.171 Almost all states imply a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing into every contract.172

164. Id. at 166 (citing Underhill v. Schenck, 143 N.E. 773, 778 (N.Y. 1924)).
165. Id. at 167.
166. Id. at 168.
167. Id.
168. U.C.C. § 1-304 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
169. See, e.g., McNally Wellman Co. v. N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp., 63 F.3d 1188,
1198 n.9 (2d Cir. 1995); Donovan v. RRL Corp., 27 P.3d 702, 718 (Cal. 2001).
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
171. 560 U.S. 330, 351 (2010).
172. See, e.g., Wright v. Martek Power, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1067 (D. Colo. 2004).
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Both the Court of Federal Claims, which hears disputes over
government contracts, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, which reviews those decisions on appeal, have found
that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to all
government contracts.173 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
clarified the scope of this covenant in two recent opinions.
First, in Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States,174 a timber
buyer sued the government, claiming that its suspension of fourteen
timber sales contracts violated the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.175 In rejecting this claim in 2010, the Federal Circuit
found no breach of the implied covenant because (1) the implied
covenant “cannot expand a party’s contractual duties beyond those in
the express contract or create duties inconsistent with the contract’s
provisions”; and (2) “one ‘benefit’ the parties did not contemplate,
and which Precision Pine is thus not entitled to under the contracts, is
the guarantee of uninterrupted performance.”176
Second, in 2011, the Court of Federal Claims applied a similar
analysis in Metcalf Construction Co. v. United States177 to find that the
government had not violated the implied covenant by telling a
construction contractor during its request for proposals that the soil at
a job site had “slight expansion potential” and then stating after the
contract took effect (and after additional testing) that the expansion
potential was “moderate to high.”178 However, the Federal Circuit
reversed in its 2014 opinion in the case, in the process clarifying the
scope of the implied covenant.179
According to the Federal Circuit, the implied covenant “imposes
obligations on both contracting parties that include the duty not to
interfere with the other party’s performance and not to act so as to
destroy the reasonable expectations of the other party regarding the
fruits of the contract.”180 Therefore, the terms of a contract help to
define the scope of the covenant because they establish the

173. See Nat’l Austl. Bank v. United States, 452 F.3d 1321, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
174. 596 F.3d 817 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
175. Id. at 820.
176. Id. at 831.
177. 102 Fed. Cl. 334 (2011), rev’d, 742 F.3d 984 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
178. Id. at 348–49.
179. Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 742 F.3d 984, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
180. Id. at 991 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Centex Corp. v. United States, 395 F.3d
1283, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).

97 N.C. L. REV. 31 (2018)

2018]

PLEA AGREEMENTS

53

reasonable expectations of the parties.181 But the Federal Circuit
rejected the contention that the implied covenant cannot impose
duties beyond those contained in express contract provisions; instead,
“a breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing does not
require a violation of an express provision in the contract.”182
In reaching this conclusion, the court refused to read Precision
Pine broadly and instead reaffirmed its prior opinion in Bradley v.
Chiron Corp.183 The Metcalf court emphasized that in Bradley, the
Federal Circuit cited a California case holding that “the covenant is
implied as a supplement to the express contractual covenants, to
prevent a contracting party from engaging in conduct which (while
not technically transgressing the express covenants) frustrates the
other party’s rights to the benefits of the contract.”184 Therefore, the
implied covenant allows a government contractor to claim that the
government violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the contract.185
Because plea agreements are, in effect, government contracts,
the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the implied covenant is the best
analog for construing the covenant in the plea-bargaining process.
This analogy makes even more sense given that parties to traditional
contracts receive only the protections of contract law,186 while both
pleading defendants and government contractors have rights against
the government secured by the Due Process Clause.187
D. The Implied Covenant and Plea Agreements
Given that the Supreme Court has held that plea agreements are
essentially contracts,188 it is unsurprising that the First,189 Second,190
181. Id. (quoting Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
182. Id. at 994.
183. Id.; 136 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
184. Metcalf, 742 F.3d at 994 (first citing Bradley, 136 F.3d at 1326; and then quoting
Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. Cal. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335, 338
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992)).
185. See Fisher v. United States, 128 Fed. Cl. 780, 787–88 (2016) (concluding that the
plaintiff’s implied covenant claim was not duplicative of his contract claims).
186. See, e.g., Parker v. BancorpSouth Bank, 253 S.W.3d 918, 924 (Ark. 2007).
187. See, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934) (finding that “[r]ights
against the United States arising out of a contract with it are protected by the Fifth
Amendment” and that “the due process clause prohibits the United States from
annulling” contracts of war risk insurance); ATL, Inc. v. United States, 736 F.2d 677, 683
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that “minimum requirements of due process come into play” with
government contracts because bidders “have a liberty interest at stake”).
188. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009); see also supra text
accompanying notes 59–62.
189. United States v. Doe, 170 F.3d 223, 226 (1st Cir. 1999) (Bownes, J., concurring).
190. United States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990).
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Third,191 Fourth,192 Sixth,193 Seventh,194 Eighth,195 Ninth,196 Tenth,197
and D.C.198 Circuits have partially incorporated the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing into plea agreements, as have state
supreme courts across the country.199 Many of these opinions,
however, indicate that a prosecutor can breach the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing even without violating any express
terms of a plea agreement.200
For example, in State v. Morrison,201 in exchange for Ashley
Morrison’s guilty plea to a sex crime and acceptance of responsibility,
the State agreed not to object to Morrison’s request for a suspended
sentence.202 Thereafter, at the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor told
the judge that the version of events given by Morrison in his
acceptance of responsibility statement was “disappoint[ing]” and a
“fairy tale” in which Morrison “didn’t accept any responsibility.”203
That said, the prosecutor told the judge that he was not backing out
of the plea deal, but he made sure to tell the judge he was under no
obligation to adopt the recommendation in the plea agreement.204
Ultimately, the judge sentenced Morrison to ten years’ incarceration,
with five years suspended.205 In finding that the prosecutor breached
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Supreme
Court of South Dakota concluded that “[w]hile the agreement was
not explicitly reneged, the State impliedly argued for a tougher
sentence by voicing its discomfort with a suspended imposition.”206 In
such cases, courts are thus applying the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in the same way that they apply it in the civil
context.
191. United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 482 (3d Cir. 1998).
192. United States v. Levaur, No. 98-4309, 1999 WL 22887, at *2 (4th Cir. Jan. 21,
1999) (unpublished).
193. United States v. Hawkins, 274 F.3d 420, 430–31 (6th Cir. 2001).
194. United States v. Wilson, 390 F.3d 1003, 1012 (7th Cir. 2004).
195. United States v. Crawford, 20 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 1994).
196. United States v. Carriaga, No. 96-10427, 1997 WL 367829, at *2 (9th Cir. July 2,
1997) (unpublished).
197. Watson v. Wyoming, 83 F. App’x 292, 299 (10th Cir. 2003).
198. United States v. Jones, 58 F.3d 688, 692 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
199. See, e.g., Cole v. State, 922 A.2d 354, 359 (Del. 2005); State v. Sledge, 947 P.2d
1199, 1204 (Wash. 1997).
200. See Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 742 F.3d 984, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
201. 759 N.W.2d 118 (S.D. 2008).
202. Id. at 119.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 119–20.
205. Id. at 120.
206. Id. at 121.
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Applying the Implied Covenant to Three Key Plea-Bargaining
Situations

Facially, then, it appears as if most courts apply the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the plea-bargaining process
in a way that treats criminal defendants at least as well as parties to
other contracts, and specifically government contracts. That said,
there are three key plea-bargaining situations where most courts have
not extended the implied covenant to plea bargaining and have failed
to protect pleading defendants. This section identifies these three
situations and explains how courts can and should apply the Federal
Circuit’s interpretation of the implied covenant to produce different
results.
1. Discretionary Government Decisions
In both government contracts and plea agreements, the
government sometimes reserves sole discretion to determine whether
the other party has performed in a way that allows for additional
benefits. Currently, however, most courts review governmental
exercises of that discretion very differently in these two contexts.
a.

Substantial Assistance Motions

Prosecutors often convince defendants to plead guilty based
upon the promise to file motions known as substantial assistance
motions. Issues often arise when defendants provide some level of
assistance that prosecutors deem insufficient to trigger their
obligation to file such motions.
i. United States Sentencing Guidelines and Sentencing Ranges
When a federal judge is sentencing a criminal defendant, she
must consult the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the
“Guidelines”).207 After a federal defendant is convicted, the judge
uses the Guidelines to calculate an offense level score and a criminal
history score;208 the judge then plugs those scores into the Guidelines’
Sentencing Table to create a sentencing range.209 As an example, the
Sentencing Table would prescribe a sentencing range of 235 to 293
207. See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting
that even after the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), the requirement of consulting the Sentencing Guidelines is inescapable).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Buckner, 9 F.3d 452, 453 (6th Cir. 1993) (tabulating the
offense level score and criminal history score).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Thorpe, 191 F.3d 339, 341 (2d Cir. 1999) (using the
sentencing table).
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months’ incarceration for a defendant with an offense level score of
35 and a criminal history score of 8.210 For a defendant with the same
criminal history score but an offense level of 30—five levels lower—
the Table would prescribe a range of 135 to 168 months’
incarceration.211
In 2005, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) provided that federal judges “‘shall
impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range’ established by
the Guidelines, subject to departures in specific, limited cases.”212 In
its 2005 opinion in United States v. Booker,213 the Supreme Court
deemed this mandatory Guidelines system unconstitutional and
rendered the Guidelines system, and the sentencing range, advisory.214
Even after Booker, though, federal judges are still required to consult
the applicable sentencing range in imposing sentences.215 Moreover,
when appellate court judges review federal sentences, they consider
the applicable sentencing range as one of seven factors under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).216 Finally, an appellate court is entitled to apply a
presumption of reasonableness to a federal sentence that falls within
the applicable sentencing range.217
ii. Substantial Assistance Motions for Downward Departures
Given the continuing relevance of the Guidelines’ sentencing
range, motions for downward departures from that range still have
primary importance. According to the Guidelines, a downward
departure is a departure that leads to a judge imposing “a sentence
less than a sentence that could be imposed under the applicable
guideline range or a sentence that is otherwise less than the guideline
sentence.”218 A prosecutor can move for a downward departure under
several sections of the Guidelines, including the most frequently used
departure: a substantial assistance departure under section 5K1.1 of
the Guidelines based on assistance given before sentencing.219 Section
210. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016).
211. See id.
212. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(2012), invalidated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)).
213. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
214. Id. at 245–46.
215. See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005).
216. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (2012).
217. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).
218. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 cmt. 1(E) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016).
219. See, e.g., Daniel A. Chatham, Note, Playing with Post-Booker Fire: The Dangers
of Increased Judicial Discretion in Federal White Collar Sentencing, 32 J. CORP. L. 619, 622
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5K1.1 states in relevant part that “[u]pon motion of the government
stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.”220
Prosecutors frequently use section 5K1.1 in making plea
agreements with defendants;221 indeed, the section was created to
increase cooperation with law enforcement “and, as a necessary
corollary, to maximize the number of times the section would be
invoked.”222
After Booker, federal judges must follow a three-step process
when a prosecutor files a substantial assistance motion for a
downward departure under section 5K1.1: (1) continue to calculate
the applicable Guidelines range, (2) formally rule on the motion for a
downward departure and state whether they are granting the
departure and how that departure effects the Guidelines calculation,
and (3) determine whether the reasonableness factors under § 3553(a)
justify a modification of the sentence that resulted from applying
steps one and two.223
United States v. Ireland224 provides an illustration of this threestep process. In Ireland, Ian Ireland was charged with various crimes
connected to a conspiracy to sell drugs and launder money.225
Subsequently, he entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which he
would plead guilty to some of the charges and provide information
regarding his co-conspirators in anticipation of the prosecutor filing a
section 5K1.1 motion.226 At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution
did indeed make a substantial assistance motion for a five-level
downward departure under section 5K1.1.227
Under step one, the court determined Ireland’s sentencing range
under the Guidelines to be 235 to 293 months’ incarceration.228 Under
n.20 (2007) (“The most frequently used departure is the substantial assistance motion
listed under section 5K1.1.”).
220. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
2016).
221. See, e.g., The American College of Trial Lawyers Report and Proposal on Section
5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1503, 1520 (2001).
222. Bruce M. Selya & John C. Massaro, The Illustrative Role of Substantial Assistance
Departures in Combating Ultra-Uniformity, 35 B.C. L. REV. 799, 810 (1994).
223. United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006); see also United States v.
Vazquez-Lebron, 582 F.3d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 2009).
224. No. 1:07-CR-249-BLW, 2010 WL 4342324 (D. Idaho Nov. 1, 2010).
225. Id. at *1.
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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step two, the court granted the State’s motion for a five-level
downward departure, which led to a sentencing range of 135 to 168
months.229 Finally, under step three, after considering the § 3553(a)
factors, the court imposed a sentence of 108 months, which fell below
the Guidelines.230
iii. Prosecutorial Discretion over Substantial Assistance Motions
Only the prosecution, and not the defense, can file a substantial
assistance motion for a downward departure under section 5K1.1.231
Moreover, in the absence of a plea agreement to the contrary, the
prosecution has the power, not the duty, to file such a motion and
cannot be compelled by the court to file such a motion.232
Typically, there are two ways that prosecutors handle section
5K1.1 motions. First, in a minority of cases, the prosecution will make
an “unambiguous, unconditional promise to file a downward
departure motion.”233 Such a promise binds the prosecution, meaning
that the failure to file such a motion is a breach entitling the
defendant to relief.234 Second, “[n]ormally, the government retains the
discretion to determine whether a defendant’s assistance is
‘substantial’ enough to warrant a § 5K1.1 motion.”235 Similarly, the
government typically retains discretion over whether to file a motion
for sentence reduction under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
35(b), which covers substantial assistance given by defendants after
sentencing.236
For instance, in United States v. Aderholt,237 the prosecution and
defense signed a plea agreement that stated in relevant part:
The United States reserves its option to seek any departure
from the applicable sentencing guidelines, pursuant to United
States Sentencing Guidelines § 5K1.1, or Rule 35(b) of the
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1486 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The
Supreme Court recently confirmed that only the government may move to downwardly
depart on the basis of a defendant’s substantial assistance.”).
232. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992).
233. United States v. Barresse, 115 F.3d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 1997).
234. See id.
235. United States v. Hart, 397 F.3d 643, 646–47 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Barresse, 115
F.3d at 612). Many defendants, however, fail to realize that the government retains this
discretion. See Brandon J. Lester, Note, System Failure: The Case for Supplanting
Negotiation with Mediation in Plea Bargaining, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 563, 591
n.127 (2005).
236. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b)(1).
237. 87 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 1996).
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Federal Rules Criminal Procedure, if in the sole discretion of
the United States, it is determined that such a departure is
appropriate.238
iv. Failure to File and Prosecutorial Breach
Defendants often claim that prosecutors breach plea agreements
by failing to file substantial assistance motions, leading to courts
having to resolve the claim. In a typical case in which a pleading
defendant claims prosecutorial breach, (1) the prosecution and
defense sign a plea agreement in which the prosecutor makes the
conditional promise to file a section 5K1.1 motion if the defendant
provides substantial assistance, (2) the defendant provides some level
of assistance to the government, (3) the prosecutor unilaterally
decides that this assistance does not qualify as substantial assistance,
(4) the prosecutor refuses to file a section 5K1.1 motion, and (5) the
defendant claims that the prosecution breached the plea agreement.239
In its 1992 opinion in Wade v. United States,240 the Supreme
Court addressed a different but related claim. As the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals explained in United States v. Wade,241 shortly after
he was arrested, “and without the benefit of a plea agreement, Wade
began a course of cooperation which provided valuable assistance to
the government in other prosecutions, leading to the conviction of coconspirators.”242 After Wade pleaded guilty and the prosecution did
not file a section 5K1.1 motion, he appealed, claiming that the court
should inquire into the government’s motives for not filing a
motion.243
In response, the Supreme Court concluded that district courts
have the authority to review the prosecution’s failure to file a
substantial assistance motion and grant relief if the defendant makes
a colorable claim that the failure was because of an unconstitutional
motive like discrimination based upon the defendant’s race or
religion.244 The Court, however, noted that Wade had not made such
a claim and denied him relief.245

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 742.
See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d 45, 46 (5th Cir. 1993).
504 U.S. 181 (1992).
936 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 504 U.S. 181 (1992).
Id. at 170.
Id. at 171.
Wade, 504 U.S. at 185–86.
Id. at 186–87.
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Since Wade, a circuit split has developed over how courts should
handle a prosecutor’s refusal to file a section 5K1.1 motion after
conditionally promising to file one in a plea agreement. A majority of
federal circuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that
they cannot review the failure to file such a motion for bad faith.246
According to these courts, a prosecutor’s failure to file is only
reviewable if the defendant has claimed racial, religious, or other
invidious discrimination.247
For instance, in United States v. Garcia-Bonilla,248 Jose GarciaBonilla was charged with several drug-related offenses.249 The two
sides thereafter entered into a plea agreement that contained a clause
in which the prosecution conditionally promised to make a section
5K1.1 or Rule 35(b) motion “if in its discretion, it is determined that
such a departure is appropriate.”250 Garcia-Bonilla then provided
information to the government before sentencing, but the prosecutor
ultimately refused to file a section 5K1.1 motion, claiming that this
information “turned up basically nothing but dead ends.”251
This claim led the district court judge to comment, “Every time I
take a plea with the U.S. Attorney’s office, there is lots of discussion
about 5K1.1 at time of taking of the plea and then once in a while a
Section 5K1.1 motion is, in fact, filed, but much more often than not,
there isn’t.”252 According to the defense, the judge’s reaction invited
appellate review of the prosecution’s possible bad faith in failing to
file a section 5K1.1 motion.253 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, concluding
that the plea agreement did not obligate the prosecution to file a
substantial assistance motion.254 Instead, Garcia-Bonilla could only be
entitled to relief if he could establish that the failure to file was based
upon an “unconstitutional motive.”255 Because Garcia-Bonilla made
no such allegation, the Fifth Circuit denied him relief.256

246. See United States v. Kovac, 23 F. App’x 931, 937 n.6 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing cases
from the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits).
247. See id.
248. 11 F.3d 45 (5th Cir. 1993).
249. Id. at 45.
250. Id. at 46.
251. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant Jose Garcia Bonilla at 10, Garcia-Bonilla, 11
F.3d 45 (No. 93-7124), 1993 WL 13099558, at *10.
252. See id. at 8.
253. See id. at 9.
254. See Garcia-Bonilla, 11 F.3d at 47.
255. See id.
256. See id.
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Some courts have expressed frustration with this approach taken
by the majority of circuits. In United States v. Hawkins,257 Antwand
Hawkins pleaded guilty to two bank robberies in connection with a
plea agreement that stated that “determination of whether
defendant’s conduct rises to the level of ‘substantial assistance’ will lie
with the United States in its sole discretion.”258 At the time this plea
agreement was executed, it was anticipated that Hawkins would be
the sole witness against one of his accomplices, David Davis, because
another accomplice, Jordell Steen, was deemed incompetent to stand
trial and another witness, Mahogany Austin, could not be located.259
Ultimately, however, Steen was deemed competent and Austin was
located; both eventually testified against Davis.260 Hawkins, however,
testified as well, and “the AUSA relied heavily on Hawkins’s
testimony to support the government’s case against Davis.”261
Nonetheless, the prosecution refused to file a substantial assistance
motion.262
Before both the district court and the Sixth Circuit during oral
arguments, the prosecution admitted “that Hawkins did absolutely
everything required of him under the plea agreement.”263 A threejudge panel of the Sixth Circuit thus determined that Hawkins had
shown not simply that he supplied substantial assistance but also “that
the government’s reasons for not filing a downward departure motion
were not rationally related to any legitimate government end.”264 The
panel, however, recognized that prior Sixth Circuit precedent only
allowed for review of a failure to file based upon an allegation of an
unconstitutional motive.265 Therefore, the panel denied Hawkins
relief but (unsuccessfully) “urge[d] en banc review of this case” so
that the Sixth Circuit could circumscribe its reading of Wade.266
A minority of federal circuits have already limited the
application of Wade to allow courts to review claims that prosecutors
breach plea bargains by failing to file in bad faith.267 For example, in

257. 274 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2001).
258. Id. at 423.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 423–24.
261. Id. at 424.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 433.
264. Id. at 434.
265. See id. at 435.
266. See id.
267. See United States v. Kovac, 23 Fed. App’x 931, 937 & n.7 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing
cases from the Second, Third, and D.C. Circuits).
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United States v. Isaac,268 Rupert Isaac entered into a plea agreement
on drug and weapons charges; the agreement contained a clause
stating that the government would file a 5K1.1 motion “if the
government, in its sole discretion, determines that the defendant has
provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense.”269
Thereafter, Isaac met with law enforcement on a few occasions
and provided them information about criminal activity of others, but
the prosecution refused to file a section 5K1.1 motion, claiming that it
had been unable to verify or independently corroborate the
information.270 Isaac thus moved for an order directing the
prosecution to file a section 5K1.1 motion but acknowledged that he
was not alleging the government’s failure to file was based upon
constitutionally suspect grounds.271 As a result, the district court
denied him relief.272
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed. The court acknowledged
the existence of Wade and cited it for the proposition that “where the
defendant has not entered a plea agreement, it is clear that the
prosecutor has almost unreviewable discretion over whether to file a
substantial assistance motion.”273 Isaac, however, had entered into a
plea agreement, and the Third Circuit concluded that “it is equally
clear that when a defendant has entered into a plea agreement
expressly requiring the government to make a § 5K1.1 motion, a
district court has broad powers to enforce the terms of the plea
contract.”274
The Third Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Santobello v. New York and its holding that plea agreements are
contractual in nature, meaning that courts apply contract law
principles to determine whether they have been satisfied.275 The court
then applied the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
finding that Isaac had a reasonable expectation that the prosecution
268. 141 F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 1998).
269. Id. at 479.
270. See id. at 479–80.
271. See id.
272. See id. at 480.
273. Id. at 481.
274. Id.
275. See id. at 481–82 (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)). The
Third Circuit went on to note that “[t]his court has reasoned from Santobello to the
general proposition that ‘[a]lthough a plea agreement occurs in a criminal context, it
remains contractual in nature and is to be analyzed under contract-law principles.’” Id. at
481 (quoting United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1361 (3d Cir. 1989)).
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would evaluate his cooperation in good faith.276 Therefore, the Third
Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether
the government acted in bad faith.277
Case law from across the country, including the Federal Circuit,
suggests that the Third Circuit acted correctly. It is well established by
courts nationwide that when a contract gives one party the power to
make discretionary decisions without defined standards, that party
must act in accordance with the other party’s reasonable expectations
and not in an arbitrary or capricious fashion.278
In its 2007 opinion in North Star Alaska Housing Corp. v. United
States,279 the Court of Federal Claims dealt with a situation that was
strikingly similar to the situations in Garcia-Bonilla, Hawkins, and
Isaac. In North Star, the plaintiff won a government contract and
lease to build a 400-unit housing project for soldiers and their families
at Fort Wainwright, Alaska.280 According to the lease, “the Army, ‘at
its option’ may pay North Star an ‘incentive fee’ of up to five percent
of the maintenance rent for the period of time for which North Star’s
performance is found by the Army to ‘substantially exceed the
established standards’ of the Lease.”281
When the Army did not pay this incentive fee, the plaintiff
brought a breach of contract action.282 The Army responded that the
lease contained no obligation for it to award the incentive fee,
meaning that its decision not to reward one was unreviewable.283 The
Court of Federal Claims disagreed, citing to prior precedent holding
“that a range of seemingly unilateral contracting decisions may be set
aside if agency officials considered factors that were not relevant,
followed improper procedures, or otherwise acted arbitrarily.”284
Specifically, the court noted that, even when the government is given
absolute discretion, it must comply with the implied covenant of good

276. See id. at 483.
277. See id. at 484.
278. See, e.g., Cavendish Farms, Inc. v. Mathiason Farms, Inc., 792 N.W.2d 500, 506
(N.D. 2010) (“When a contract gives a party discretion the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing bars that party from exercising that discretion in an arbitrary or
unreasonable manner.”).
279. 76 Fed. Cl. 158 (2007).
280. See id. at 160.
281. Id. at 204.
282. See id. at 161.
283. See id. at 204.
284. Id. (citing NI Indus., Inc. v. United States, 841 F.2d 1104, 1106 (Fed. Cir. 1988));
see also George Sollitt Constr. Co. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 229, 247 (2005); RCS
Enters. v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 303, 309 (2002).
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faith and fair dealing.285 Ultimately, the court concluded that the
Army breached the implied covenant,286 and it has made similar
conclusions in other cases.287
v. Applying the Implied Covenant to Substantial Assistance Motions
Given that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
applies to the government’s discretionary decisions in government
contracts,288 there is a good argument under this Article’s thesis that
the implied covenant should automatically apply to government
discretionary decisions in plea agreements, such as the decision to not
file a substantial assistance motion. In the absence of such an
automatic application, courts would need to consult the three
Eldridge factors: (1) the petitioner’s private interest, (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation of this interest through the current
procedure(s) and the probable value of additional safeguards, and (3)
the government’s countervailing interest.289
The most relevant analog for this analysis is Ake v. Oklahoma, in
which the Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant has a due
process right of access to the services of a competent psychiatrist if he
can make a threshold showing that his sanity is likely to be a factor in
his defense.290 Under the first factor—the private interest involved—
the Court recognized that “[t]he private interest in the accuracy of a
criminal proceeding that places an individual’s life or liberty at risk is
almost uniquely compelling.”291 This interest is directly implicated
when a defendant (1) decides to sign a plea agreement based upon a
prosecutor’s conditional promise to file a substantial assistance
motion, and (2) later claims that the prosecutor acted in bad faith by
failing to file such a motion.
The Ake Court found under the third factor—the government’s
countervailing interest—that any interest the prosecution has in
prevailing must be tempered by the interest in a fair and accurate

285. See id.
286. See id.
287. See, e.g., Orange Cove Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 790, 800 (1993)
(“When one party has the authority to exercise discretion to determine an essential term
of a contract . . . the covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that the exercise of
that discretion be reasonable.” (citing Boone v. Kerr-McGee Oil Indus., 217 F.2d 63, 65
(10th Cir. 1954))).
288. See id.
289. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
290. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985).
291. Id. at 78.
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adjudication of criminal cases.292 In Santobello, the Court concluded
that these same considerations apply to the plea-bargaining process.293
Moreover, the Court in Ake refuted the State’s claim that granting
indigent defendants the right to psychiatric assistance would be
unduly burdensome by noting that several jurisdictions already
recognize the right without incident.294 As noted, a minority of
jurisdictions already apply the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to allow courts to review refusals to file substantial assistance
motions for bad faith.295 Therefore, there is not a good argument that
bad faith hearings would be unduly burdensome. As the Third Circuit
noted in Isaac, “[t]he sole requirement is that the government’s
position be based on an honest evaluation of the assistance provided
and not on considerations extraneous to that assistance.”296
Finally, under the second factor—the risk of erroneous
deprivation and the probative value of additional safeguards—the
Ake Court noted “the pivotal role that psychiatry has come to play in
criminal proceedings” and the importance of psychiatric assistance in
ensuring that the jury can make a sensible and educated
determination about the defendant’s mental state.297 While this is
true, only about one percent of felony defendants raise the insanity
defense.298 Conversely, about ninety-five percent of criminal cases are
resolved by plea agreements, and the most popular downward
departure motion included in such agreements is the substantial
assistance motion.299 Moreover, just as jurors are not able to resolve
insanity pleas without psychiatrist participation, courts are unable to
determine whether prosecutors breached plea agreements if they are
only allowed to review refusals to file substantial assistance motions
for unconstitutional motives.
Finally, after balancing all three Eldridge factors, the Ake Court
concluded that an indigent defendant is only entitled to psychiatric
assistance if he can make the threshold showing that his sanity is
likely to be a factor in his defense.300 A similar limitation can, and has
been, applied in the substantial assistance motion context. In Isaac,
292. Id. at 79.
293. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971).
294. Ake, 470 U.S. at 78.
295. See supra text accompanying note 267.
296. United States v. Isaac, 141 F.3d 477, 484 (3d Cir. 1998).
297. Ake, 470 U.S. at 79, 81.
298. Bonita M. Veysey, Gender Role Incongruence and the Adjudication of Criminal
Responsibility, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2015).
299. See supra text accompanying notes 3, 219.
300. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82–83.
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the Third Circuit held that Isaac was entitled to a hearing on whether
the government acted in good faith in failing to file a substantial
assistance motion only if he made a threshold showing of bad faith.301
Only one federal circuit court has applied the Eldridge test to
review refusals to file substantial assistance motions. In United States
v. Valencia,302 Sergio Aguera was convicted of conspiring to possess
cocaine with intent to distribute after a jury trial.303 Subsequent to
sentencing, Aguera appealed, claiming that the prosecution failed to
file a section 5K1.1 motion despite the fact that he provided the
government substantial assistance.304
In response, the Seventh Circuit cited Eldridge but concluded
that it did not help Aguera because he presupposed a nonexistent
right to have the court consider his assistance in sentencing.305 Later,
the Seventh Circuit applied this same reasoning in United States v.
Donatiu,306 where the defendant did not reach a plea agreement but
still ended up pleading guilty.307
These conclusions are, of course, correct, as was the Supreme
Court’s conclusion in Wade: a defendant has no freestanding right to
have (1) a prosecutor file a substantial assistance motion, or (2) the
judge consider his assistance in sentencing.308 But if the prosecution
conditionally promises in a plea agreement to file such a motion, the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should require that
the prosecutor’s decision not be made in bad faith. This would place
pleading defendants on a level playing field with parties to
government contracts, and it would not require overruling Wade.
Courts would simply need to find that Wade is inapplicable when a
plea agreement is in place.
2. The Duty to Disclose Material Evidence
Before entering into a government contract or plea agreement, a
company or citizen has an interest in the government disclosing
material information that has bearing upon the deal. Currently,
however, courts place significantly different obligations upon the
government in these two situations.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Isaac, 141 F.3d at 484.
913 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 380.
Id. at 386.
Id.
922 F.2d 1331 (7th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 1336.
See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186–87 (1991).
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Brady v. Maryland and Plea Agreements

In Brady v. Maryland,309 the Supreme Court concluded that the
Due Process Clause places an affirmative obligation on the State to
timely disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defense.310 The
Court later clarified that evidence is material when there is a
reasonable probability that its disclosure would have led to a different
result, i.e., an acquittal or lesser sentence.311 The American Bar
Association later followed up on Brady by adopting Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.8(d), which currently states that a prosecutor
must “make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused or mitigates the offense.”312
There can be a Brady violation based upon the government
failing to disclose material substantive evidence, such as a confession
by a government’s witness that he, and not the defendant, committed
the crime at issue.313 Moreover, in Giglio v. United States,314 the
Supreme Court concluded that Brady covers material impeachment
evidence that calls into question the credibility of a key witness for
the prosecution.315 For instance, in Giglio, the prosecution violated
Brady by failing to disclose that the defendant’s alleged coconspirator and chief witness for the prosecution was testifying
pursuant to a promise that he would not be prosecuted if he testified
against the defendant.316
In its subsequent 2002 opinion in United States v. Ruiz,317 the
Supreme Court partially determined the relationship between Brady
and plea bargaining. In Ruiz, immigration agents found thirty
kilograms of marijuana in Angela Ruiz’s luggage.318 Federal
prosecutors thereafter offered Ruiz a “fast track” plea bargain,
pursuant to which the government would recommend a two-level
downward departure under the Sentencing Guidelines in exchange
for Ruiz waiving indictment, trial, and appeal.319 The plea deal also
required Ruiz to “‘waiv[e] the right’ to receive ‘impeachment
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Id. at 87.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
See, e.g., Scott v. Mullin, 303 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2002).
405 U.S. 150 (1972).
Id. at 154–55.
Id. at 152.
536 U.S. 622 (2002).
Id. at 625.
Id.
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information relating to any informants or other witnesses’ as well as
the right to receive information supporting any affirmative defense
the defendant raises if the case goes to trial.”320 Because Ruiz would
not agree to this last requirement, she rejected the plea deal but later
ended up pleading guilty to unlawful drug possession, without any
plea agreement.321
At sentencing, Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the same twolevel downward departure that she would have received under the
plea deal, but the judge instead imposed the standard Guidelines
sentence.322 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the disputed
provision was a Brady waiver and that the right to Brady material
cannot be waived without offending the due process requirement that
defendants enter plea agreements voluntarily and intelligently.323
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed and more generally
found that there is no Brady right to material impeachment evidence
before pleading guilty for three reasons.324 First, the Court concluded
that “impeachment information is special in relation to the fairness of
a trial, not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary.”325 Second, the
Court found that a defendant can voluntarily plead guilty and thus
waive several constitutional rights “despite various forms of
misapprehension under which a defendant might labor,” such as his
attorney misjudging the admissibility of a confession or failing to
point out a potential defense.326 Third, the Court applied the Eldridge
factors. Under the first factor—the private interest involved—the
Ruiz Court implicitly acknowledged a criminal defendant’s
compelling interest in obtaining material impeachment evidence.327
With regard to the second Eldridge factor—the risk of erroneous
deprivation and the probative value of additional safeguards—the
Court made two conclusions. First, the proposed plea deal contained
a clause obligating the prosecution to provide “‘any information
establishing the factual innocence of the defendant’ regardless.”328
According to the Court, “[t]hat fact,” plus the safeguards of Rule 11,
“diminishes the force of Ruiz’s concern that, in the absence of
impeachment information, innocent individuals, accused of crimes,
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id.
Id. at 625–26.
Id. at 626.
United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2001).
Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629–31.
Id. at 629 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 629–30.
See id.
Id. at 631.
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will plead guilty.”329 Second, the Court concluded that the added
value of a right to material impeachment evidence would often be
“limited, for it depends upon the defendant’s independent awareness
of the details of the Government’s case.”330
Finally, regarding the third factor—the government’s
countervailing interest—the Court found that requiring pre-plea
disclosure of material impeachment evidence could (1) disrupt
ongoing investigations by risking premature disclosure of government
witness information, (2) force the government to devote more
resources to cases prior to plea bargaining, and/or (3) cause the
government to cease its heavy reliance on plea bargaining.331
As a result of Ruiz, defendants across the country do not have a
Brady right to material impeachment evidence prior to plea
bargaining.332 On the other hand, the Ruiz Court did not resolve the
issue of whether defendants have a Brady right to material substantive
evidence prior to plea bargaining.333 In the absence of Supreme Court
guidance, a circuit split has developed over the issue.334
The Fifth Circuit is one of the courts that has extended Ruiz to
substantive evidence. In United States v. Conroy,335 Pamelia Conroy
pleaded guilty to fraud charges based upon, inter alia, statements she
made to Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) about
her house in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.336 After pleading guilty,
Conroy learned about a previously undisclosed FBI interview of her
friend Sandra Pierce.337 According to the FBI report on the interview,
Pierce was present for Conroy’s call to the FEMA representative,
everything Conroy told the representative was accurate, and Conroy
left the conversation believing she qualified for FEMA funding.338
In finding that there was no Brady violation, the Fifth Circuit
rejected Conroy’s argument that Ruiz only applies to impeachment

329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 631–32.
332. See, e.g., Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 620 (6th Cir. 2014).
333. See McBride v. Bryant, No. 8:12-CV-2895-RMG, 2013 WL 4500050, at *16 (D.S.C.
Aug. 21, 2013) (“[T]he Court expressly declined to consider whether this rule also applied
to exculpatory substantive evidence.”).
334. See Robertson, 753 F.3d at 621 (“We have not yet had occasion to determine
whether Ruiz applies to exculpatory Brady material, a question that has caused some
disagreement among our sister circuits.”).
335. 567 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2009).
336. Id. at 176.
337. Id. at 176–77.
338. Id. at 177.
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evidence and not substantive evidence.339 According to the court,
“Ruiz never makes such a distinction nor can this proposition be
implied from its discussion.”340
In United States v. Ohiri,341 the Tenth Circuit took the opposite
approach.342 In Ohiri, the prosecution charged Emmanuel Ohiri and
John Thomas Morris with conspiracy to transport, store, and dispose
of hazardous waste in violation of the Resources and Conservation
Recovery Act.343 Before Morris pleaded guilty, he completed an
Acceptance of Responsibility statement, in which he claimed that
“Manny Ohiri was not informed of my waste management strategy
and techniques in this particular case.”344
Because the prosecution did not disclose this statement before
Ohiri’s guilty plea, he later appealed, claiming a Brady violation.345 In
finding that this claim was potentially viable, the Tenth Circuit
determined that the Supreme Court’s conclusion with regard to
impeachment evidence in Ruiz “did not imply that the government
may avoid the consequence of a Brady violation if the defendant
accepts an eleventh-hour plea agreement while ignorant of withheld
exculpatory evidence in the government’s possession.”346
State courts have similarly split over the issue. For example, in
Buffey v. Ballard,347 David Ballard pleaded guilty to two counts of
sexual assault and one count of robbery pursuant to a plea
agreement.348 After pleading guilty, Ballard learned that DNA testing
had been done in the case, leading to a report concluding:
“[A]ssuming there are only two contributors (including [the victim]),
Joseph Buffey is excluded as the donor of the seminal fluid identified
[from the rape kit] cuttings.”349 The Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia found that the nondisclosure of this DNA testing was a
Brady violation, concluding that “Ruiz specifically distinguished
impeachment evidence from exculpatory evidence.”350

339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

Id. at 179.
Id.; see also Friedman v. Rehal, 618 F.3d 142, 154 (2d Cir. 2010).
133 F. App’x 555 (10th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 556.
Id.
Id. at 557–58.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 562; see also McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2003).
782 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 2015).
Id. at 206.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 213.
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Conversely, in Walton v. State,351 the Court of Appeals of
Mississippi found that no such distinction exists.352 In Walton, four
assailants wearing masks brutally beat a pizza-delivery employee on
Halloween night.353 Kenny Walton, Jasmond Matthews, Corderal
McKnight, and Michael McGee were charged in connection with the
assault.354 Walton eventually pleaded guilty to the crime without
being told that both Matthews and McKnight told police that
Desmond Johnson and Nookie Alexander were the other two men
involved in the assault.355 In rejecting Walton’s ensuing Brady claim,
the Court of Appeals of Mississippi concluded that Ruiz did not
distinguish between impeachment and substantive evidence.356
In such cases, defendants frequently seek federal habeas relief
after state courts deny their Brady claims. In order to secure habeas
relief, however, defendants must show that state courts have violated
clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme
Court.357 As noted, some circuit courts have found that Ruiz does not
distinguish between impeachment and substantive evidence;
therefore, federal district courts in these circuits have denied habeas
relief to defendants who did not receive material substantive evidence
before pleading guilty.358 Moreover, both federal circuit courts359 and
district courts360 in circuits that have yet to address the scope of Ruiz
have denied habeas relief in such cases due to the circuit split.
b.

The Implied Covenant and the Superior Knowledge Doctrine

Courts have handled the duty to disclose material evidence very
differently in the government contract context. In government
contracts, it is well established that, “[u]nder the implied duty of good
351. 165 So. 3d 516 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).
352. Id. at 524–25.
353. Id. at 518.
354. Id. at 519.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 524–25.
357. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).
358. See, e.g., Wiand v. United States, No. 3:10-CV-1420-M, 2012 WL 1033623, at *3, *5
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2012) (denying habeas relief based on the Fifth Circuit’s reading of
Ruiz).
359. See, e.g., Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 621–22 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding no
clearly established obligation on the government to disclose material substantive evidence
due to the circuit split).
360. See, e.g., Carter v. Hobbs, No. 5:10CV00346 JMM/JTR, 2013 WL 1668988, at *6
(E.D. Ark. Mar. 25, 2013) (“Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, numerous courts have
concluded that there is no federal constitutional right to the disclosure of Brady
information prior to the entry of a guilty plea, regardless of whether it is exculpatory
evidence, as opposed to impeachment evidence.”).
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faith and fair dealing, the Government maintains an implied duty to
disclose information fundamental to the preparation of estimates or
contract performance.”361 Therefore, “where the Government
possesses special knowledge not shared by the contractor, which is
vital to the performance of the contract, the Government has an
affirmative duty to disclose such knowledge. It cannot remain silent
with impunity.”362 While it is not a fiduciary for its contractors, “the
Government—where the balance of knowledge is so clearly on its
side—can no more betray a contractor into a ruinous course of action
by silence than by the written or spoken word.”363
According to the Federal Circuit, this “superior knowledge”
doctrine applies to contracts where
(1) a contractor undertakes to perform without vital knowledge
of a fact that affects performance costs or duration; (2) the
government was aware the contractor had no knowledge of and
had no reason to obtain such information; (3) any contract
specification supplied misled the contractor, or did not put it on
notice to inquire; and (4) the government failed to provide the
relevant information.364
This doctrine applied in Miller Elevator Co. v. United States,365
where the Miller Elevator Company contracted with the General
Services Administration (“GSA”) to provide elevator maintenance
services for a federal office building in St. Louis.366 Later, GSA
authorized substantial renovation to the building, resulting in an
increase to the amount and extent of work required to maintain the
elevators in the building.367 Miller responded by claiming that the
GSA had breached the contract by failing to disclose that it had
anticipated the letting of a $42 million contract for renovation of the
building before entering into the contract.368 The Court of Federal
Claims agreed, finding that Miller had satisfied all four elements of
the test, meaning that “the Government breached the implied duty of

361. Miller Elevator Co. v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 662, 674 (1994).
362. Hardeman-Monier-Hutcherson v. United States, 458 F.2d 1364, 1371–72 (Ct. Cl.
1972) (citing Helene Curtis Indus. v. United States, 312 F.2d 774, 778 (Ct. Cl. 1963)).
363. Helene Curtis Indus. v. United States, 312 F.2d 774, 778 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
364. Petrochem Servs., Inc. v. United States, 837 F.2d 1076, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(quoting Am. Shipbuilding Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 75, 79 (Ct. Cl. 1981)).
365. 30 Fed. Cl. 662 (1994).
366. Id. at 665.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 665–66.
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good faith and fair dealing by the nondisclosure of superior
knowledge.”369
Similarly, in ASI Constructors, Inc. v. United States,370 the Court
of Federal Claims denied a motion by the Army Corps of Engineers
to dismiss a claim that it violated the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing by failing to disclose material information regarding
site conditions to a government contractor performing work on a dam
in Oklahoma.371 Finally, in Petrochem Services, Inc. v. United States,372
the Federal Circuit found that the Navy violated the superior
knowledge doctrine by failing to disclose the amount of oil spilled to a
government contractor who won a contract to clean an oil spill at the
Great Lakes, Illinois, Naval Base.373
c.

Applying the Implied Covenant to Brady Evidence

Under this Article’s theory of plea agreements as constitutional
contracts, courts should incorporate the superior knowledge doctrine
into plea agreements and find a Brady violation if (1) a defendant
undertakes to perform without vital knowledge of a fact that affects
performance, (2) the government was aware the defendant had no
knowledge of and had no reason to obtain such information, (3) any
discovery supplied misled the defendant or did not put him on notice
to inquire, and (4) the government failed to provide the relevant
information. All of these factors are already part of the Brady test. To
prove a Brady violation, a defendant must establish that (1) he lacked
knowledge of material exculpatory evidence,374 (2) he could not have
obtained the evidence through reasonable diligence,375 (3) the
government’s discovery misled the defendant or did not put him on
notice to inquire,376 and (4) the government failed to disclose the
material exculpatory evidence to the defendant.377
369. Id.
370. 129 Fed. Cl. 707 (2016).
371. Id. at 720–21.
372. 837 F.2d 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
373. Id. at 1077–78.
374. See, e.g., Patrick v. City of Chicago, 154 F. Supp. 3d 705, 717 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
375. See, e.g., United States v. Prior, 546 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he
government is not obliged under Brady to furnish a defendant with information which he
already has or, with any reasonable diligence, he can obtain himself.”).
376. See, e.g., Ware v. State, 702 A.2d 699, 713–14 (Md. 1997) (finding a Brady
violation when the defendant could not have been expected to believe anything other than
the government’s intentional misrepresentations).
377. See, e.g., Gillispie v. Timmerman-Cooper, 835 F. Supp. 2d 482, 509 (S.D. Ohio
2011) (finding a Brady violation when the government failed to disclose material
exculpatory information).
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Given that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
requires the government to disclose superior knowledge of material
facts before a contractor enters into a government contract, there is a
good argument under this Article’s thesis that the implied covenant
should automatically require the government to disclose material
exculpatory evidence to defendants before they enter into plea
agreements.378 Once again, in the absence of such an automatic
application, courts would need to consult the three Eldridge factors.
As noted, the Ruiz Court actually did apply the Eldridge factors
in finding that a defendant has no Brady right to material
impeachment evidence before pleading guilty.379 However, it is
important to note that, as was the case in Wade,380 there was no plea
agreement in Ruiz.381 Therefore, there is no reason that Ruiz should
bind lower courts in cases where defendants claim that the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires disclosure of material
exculpatory evidence before a defendant enters into a plea
agreement.
Furthermore, even if Ruiz did apply in this type of case, there are
reasons to believe it should be repudiated. First, in July 2009, the
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
issued Formal Opinion 09-454, which provided guidance on the scope
of the prosecutor’s duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence to
the defense.382 According to Opinion 09-454, the prosecutor has an
obligation to disclose material exculpatory evidence “prior to a guilty
plea proceeding.”383 While the Standing Committee noted that Rule
3.8 creates a more expansive disclosure obligation than the
constitutional duty created by Brady,384 Opinion 09-454 is still
persuasive authority that calls the Ruiz holding into question.
Second, as noted, one of the Ruiz Court’s primary justifications
for not applying Brady to guilty pleas was that a defendant can
voluntarily plead guilty and thus waive several constitutional rights
“despite various forms of misapprehension under which a defendant
might labor,” such as his attorney misjudging the admissibility of a
378. See id.
379. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631–32 (2002); see also supra text
accompanying notes 327–31.
380. United States v. Wade, 936 F.2d 169, 170 (4th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 504 U.S. 181
(1992).
381. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625.
382. Kevin C. McMunigal, The (Lack of) Enforcement of Prosecutor Disclosure Rules,
38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 847, 850 (2010).
383. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454, at 6 (2009).
384. See id.
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confession or failing to point out a potential defense.385 This is no
longer the case after Lafler v. Cooper386 and Missouri v. Frye,387 which
held that the right to the effective assistance of counsel applies to the
plea-bargaining process.388 In its aforementioned opinion in Buffey v.
Ballard, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia noted that
the Court’s conclusions in Lafler and Frye “suggest that the assertion
that Brady is a ‘trial right’ will not preclude it from being applied
during plea bargaining.”389
There are also reasons to question the Court’s decision in Ruiz
under the Eldridge factors. Under the first factor—the private interest
at stake—it is clear that a criminal defendant has a uniquely
compelling interest in not being deprived of life or liberty without due
process of law.390
With regard to the second factor—the risk of erroneous
deprivation and the probative value of additional safeguards—the
Ruiz Court first found that the risk of erroneous deprivation was
mitigated by a clause in the proposed plea agreement obligating the
prosecution to provide “any information establishing the factual
innocence of the defendant.”391 This conclusion, however, ignores the
fact that Brady evidence is, by definition, evidence that creates the
reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial, principally a
“not guilty” verdict instead of a “guilty” verdict.392 Under the plea
clause in Ruiz, a defendant would seemingly be entitled to evidence
of an alternate suspect’s confession but would not be entitled to
evidence that the government’s key witness was legally blind, would
be testifying pursuant to a favorable plea deal, or was out of town on
the night of the crime.

385. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630.
386. 566 U.S. 156 (2012).
387. 566 U.S. 134 (2012).
388. See id. at 134, 143; Lafler, 566 U.S. at 162.
389. Buffey v. Ballard, 782 S.E.2d 204, 212 (W. Va. 2015) (quoting Michael N.
Petegorsky, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Brady
Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3599, 3467 (2013)); see also
Gladwell v. DeCamp, No. 3:10-cv-00061-BR, 2012 WL 5182804, at *7 n.5 (D. Or. Oct. 16,
2012) (“In light of the Supreme Court’s recent expansion of ineffective assistance of
counsel principles to the plea agreement stage in Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper,
however, the continued effect of Ruiz may well be called into question.” (citations
omitted)).
390. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78 (1985).
391. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002).
392. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678, 682 (1985) (determining the
materiality of Brady evidence).
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Essentially without explanation, the Ruiz Court’s opinion
prioritizes evidence that strengthens a defendant’s case for his
innocence over evidence that weakens the government’s case for
guilt. Such a forced dichotomy seems at odds with Model Rule 3.8(d),
which, as noted, obligates the prosecutor to “make timely disclosure
to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused.”393 Also, despite the plea
clause in Ruiz, it is clear that at least some courts, such as the Court of
Appeals of Mississippi in Walton v. State, have found that Brady does
not apply in the plea-bargaining context even when the evidence at
issue is evidence of innocence.394
Moreover, the Ruiz Court seemingly lacked support for its
conclusion that the safeguards of Rule 11 “diminish[] the force of
Ruiz’s concern that, in the absence of impeachment information,
innocent individuals, accused of crimes, will plead guilty.”395 As noted,
Rule 11 requires a judge to address a defendant personally to ensure
that his plea is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.396 It is unclear how
this safeguard protects a defendant who is pleading guilty because the
government has withheld evidence of a key weakness in its case.
The Ruiz Court also argued that the value of the Brady
safeguard in the plea-bargaining context would often be “limited, for
it depends upon the defendant’s independent awareness of the details
of the Government’s case.”397 But it is hard to imagine when this
would be true for either substantive or impeachment evidence. In the
case of forensic evidence, such as a DNA test excluding the defendant
as the source of physical evidence in the case, the probative value of
the evidence would be immediately apparent. In cases of exculpatory
statements, such as someone else telling the police, “The defendant
did not commit the crime,” “Joe Doe committed the crime,” or “I
committed the crime,” again the probative value would be clear. And,
in the impeachment context, while a defendant might not know all of
the contours of the government’s case, he would certainly recognize
the importance of an eyewitness suffering an infirmity such as legal

393. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
394. See supra text accompanying notes 351–56.
395. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631 (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465–67
(1969)).
396. See supra text accompanying note 12.
397. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630–31 (“The degree of help that impeachment information can
provide will depend on the defendant’s own independent knowledge of the prosecution’s
potential case . . . .”).

97 N.C. L. REV. 31 (2018)

2018]

PLEA AGREEMENTS

77

blindness or an accomplice having a history of crimes of dishonesty or
an agreement to testify based upon a favorable plea deal.
Finally, regarding the third factor—the government’s
countervailing interest—the Ruiz Court began by noting that
requiring disclosure of material impeachment evidence before guilty
pleas “risks premature disclosure of Government witness
information, which . . . could ‘disrupt ongoing investigations’ and
expose prospective witnesses to serious harm.”398 As support for this
conclusion, the Court cited to the Jencks Act, Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16, and 18 U.S.C. § 3432, all of which allow for
“late” disclosure of certain witness information.399 The Ruiz Court,
however, failed to acknowledge that (1) the early disclosure
requirements of Brady typically trump the later disclosure
requirements of these other laws and rules,400 and (2) the government
can request deferral of early production if it has concerns in a
particular case.401 It is unclear why the prosecution could not employ
a similar deferral procedure before plea hearings as it currently
employs before trials to quell the identified risks.
Instead of reaching such a resolution, however, the Ruiz Court
concluded that requiring disclosure of material impeachment
evidence before guilty pleas could alternately force the government to
devote more resources to plea bargaining or abandon its heavy
reliance on plea bargaining.402 Given that several states already
require disclosure of some Brady material during plea bargaining, the
Ake opinion would suggest that this fear is misplaced.403 Perhaps more
importantly, the Ruiz Court’s conclusion is fundamentally at odds
with the Court’s prior opinion in United States v. Mezzanatto.404
Typically, Federal Rule of Evidence 410 precludes the
prosecution from introducing any statements the defendant made
during plea bargaining at trial.405 But, in Mezzanatto, as a
precondition to plea bargaining, the prosecution forced the defendant
to sign a waiver indicating that any statements he made during plea
discussions could be used to impeach him in the event his case went to

398. Id. at 631–32.
399. Id. at 632 (first citing 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (2012); then citing id. § 3500 (Jencks Act);
and then citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2)).
400. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 650 F. Supp. 2d 160, 171 (D. Conn. 2009).
401. See, e.g., United States v. Lujan, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1257 (D.N.M. 2008).
402. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 632.
403. See supra text accompanying note 143.
404. 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
405. See FED. R. EVID. 410.
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trial.406 The defendant later claimed that Rule 410 was not waivable
and that allowing for waivers could “bring plea bargaining to a
grinding halt.”407
In response, the Mezzanatto Court raised some of the same
concerns that the Ruiz Court would later raise about how plea
bargaining can complicate ongoing investigations, especially given
limited governmental resources.408 But this did not lead the Court to
conclude that Rule 410 should be repealed or that the defendant’s
countervailing interest should make the Rule nonwaivable. Instead,
the Court found that “[a] sounder way to encourage settlement is to
permit the interested parties to enter into knowing and voluntary
negotiations without any arbitrary limits on their bargaining chips.”409
As a result, Rule 410 applies to plea bargaining but is waivable. If the
prosecution has a relatively strong case, the defendant might sign a
waiver to get to the plea-bargaining table; if the prosecution has a
relatively weak case, the defendant might refuse to sign a waiver and
force the prosecution to plea bargain without one.
The Mezzanatto solution seems equally applicable to the Ruiz
scenario. Indeed, the Court in Ruiz easily could have found that the
Brady waiver in the case it was reviewing was valid without reaching
the sweeping conclusion that Brady doesn’t apply in whole or in part
to the plea-bargaining process. Both the superior knowledge doctrine
and Mezzanatto suggest that the Brady doctrine should apply in the
plea-bargaining context, with the parties able to negotiate a possible
Brady waiver.
Applying the Brady doctrine to plea bargaining based on the
implied covenant would place defendants in the same position as a
government contractor. They could either negotiate away their right
to material exculpatory evidence or enter into plea agreements only
after learning about the existence of such evidence from the party
with superior knowledge.
3. The Affirmative Duty to Cooperate
A company or citizen who enters into a government contract or
plea agreement has an interest in the government affirmatively
cooperating in a manner consistent with the reasonable expectations

406.
407.
408.
409.

Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 198.
Id. at 209.
See id. at 207.
Id. at 208.
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of the party. Most courts, however, currently place significantly
different obligations upon the government in these two situations.
a.

Benchimol and the Duty Not to Undermine

In United States v. Benchimol,410 John Benchimol, a minor, was
charged with one count of mail fraud after allegedly using false names
and information to obtain credit cards.411 Benchimol entered into a
sentencing recommendation agreement, which required the
government to recommend probation with restitution in exchange for
Benchimol’s guilty plea.412 The presentence report presented at the
sentencing hearing, however, incorrectly stated that the government
would remain silent regarding the proposed sentence.413 As a result,
when the prosecutor initially said nothing, defense counsel informed
the judge that the government had in fact agreed to recommend
probation with restitution.414 In response, the prosecutor spoke his
only words regarding the government’s recommendation: “That is an
accurate representation.”415 The judge subsequently sentenced
Benchimol to six years of treatment and supervision under the Youth
Corrections Act.416
Benchimol thereafter moved to withdraw his plea or have his
sentence vacated, claiming that the government had breached the
plea agreement.417 The district court denied his motion, but the Ninth
Circuit found on appeal that the government can breach a plea
agreement by merely making “[a] perfunctory statement of the
recommendation,” which “can easily leave the impression that the
government is unconvinced that the recommendation is appropriate
or even that it tacitly disfavors the recommendation.”418 Finding that
the prosecutor made such a perfunctory statement in the case at hand,
the Ninth Circuit ruled that there was a breach, concluding “that
when the government undertakes to recommend a sentence pursuant
to a plea bargain, it has the duty to state its recommendation clearly
to the sentencing judge and to express the justification for it.”419

410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.

738 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1984), rev’d, 471 U.S. 453 (1985).
Id. at 1002.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453, 453 (1985).
Id.
Benchimol, 738 F.2d at 1002.
Id.
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The Ninth Circuit bolstered its finding by citing two other federal
circuit court opinions. In the Fifth Circuit case United States v.
Grandinetti420 the prosecutor said the following to the judge about the
recommendation in the plea agreement: “I’m not too sure of the
legality of it nor the propriety, but none the less it is there.”421
Similarly, in the Fourth Circuit case United States v. Brown422 the
prosecutor said the following to the judge about the recommendation
in a plea deal: “Well, Your Honor, I do have some problems with
that, anyhow, but that is the way I understand it.”423 Both courts
concluded that these comments breached the respective plea
agreements.424
In his dissenting opinion in Benchimol, however, Judge John
Wallace distinguished Grandinetti and Brown as cases where “the
prosecutors expressed open distaste for the plea bargains” as opposed
to lukewarm support.425 According to Judge Wallace, neither the
Supreme Court Rules nor the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility imposes a duty of zeal on prosecutors in “fulfilling a
bargain, nor could they” because “[t]he defendant is not the
prosecutor’s client.”426
In its 1985 opinion in United States v. Benchimol,427 the Supreme
Court agreed with Judge Wallace’s dissent in a per curiam opinion.428
The Court began by noting that the government in a given case might
agree as part of a plea deal to “enthusiastically” recommend a certain
sentence or explain the reasons behind its recommendation.429 It then
found, though, that the parties had struck no such bargain in the
present case and that the Ninth Circuit had instead implied an
obligation to enthusiastically recommend a sentence based upon the
government’s promise to recommend a particular sentence.430 The
Court then rejected this reasoning, concluding that Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 “does not suggest . . . such implied-in-law
terms as were read into this agreement by the Court of Appeals.”431
420. 564 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1977).
421. Id. at 725.
422. 500 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1974).
423. Id. at 377.
424. Grandinetti, 564 F.2d at 727; Brown, 500 F.2d at 378.
425. United States v. Benchimol, 738 F.2d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 1984) (Wallace, J.,
dissenting), rev’d, 471 U.S. 453 (1985).
426. Id.
427. 471 U.S. 453 (1985).
428. See id.
429. Id. at 455.
430. Id.
431. Id.
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Finally, the Court agreed with Judge Wallace’s determination that
Grandinetti and Brown were inapposite because the prosecutors
expressed reservations about the plea agreements in those cases
instead of merely offering tepid support, as was the case in
Benchimol.432
Since Benchimol, most courts have agreed with its dichotomy
and held that a prosecutor may express less than enthusiastic support
for a plea agreement as long as the prosecutor “does not undermine
her own promised sentencing recommendation by expressing her
personal reservations at the sentencing hearing.”433 For instance, in
United States v. Hand,434 the prosecutor agreed to recommend a twolevel reduction in sentencing level based upon the defendant’s minor
participation in a drug crime.435 At the sentencing hearing, the
prosecutor said the following:
Regarding role in the offense, we again recommend that this
defendant receive a reduction for having a minor role in the
offense. That was my assessment at that time. The court’s well
aware of the facts in this case and can make its own conclusion.
We’ve agreed to recommend that, however.436
Hand later appealed, arguing “that the government violated the
spirit, if not the letter, of the plea agreement.”437 In finding that this
statement did not breach the plea agreement, the Tenth Circuit cited
Benchimol to conclude that, “[a]lthough the prosecutor’s simple
statement that the court could reach its own conclusion was
unnecessary and probably imprudent under the circumstances, it was
not tantamount to an argument that the recommendation should be
disregarded or that the reduction would be improper.”438
In turn, the Seventh Circuit cited this language from Hand in
United States v. Jimenez,439 a case in which the prosecutor actually
made an unconditional promise to file a section 5K1.1 motion for a

432. Id. at 456.
433. State v. Shaffer, 239 P.3d 285, 292 (Utah Ct. App. 2010); see also Kevin Arns,
Note, Not All Plea Breaches Are Equal: Examining Heredia’s Extension of Implicit Breach
Analysis, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 617, 629 (2016) (noting that circuit courts generally allow
prosecutors to express less than enthusiastic support for a sentencing recommendation as
long as they do not undermine that recommendation).
434. 913 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1990).
435. Id. at 855.
436. Id. at 856.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 857.
439. 992 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1993).
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downward departure.440 The prosecutor completed, but did not file, a
5K1.1 motion, but he did make a brief oral request for a downward
departure at the sentencing hearing.441 The judge did not grant a
downward departure, stating that “[t]he government’s . . . apparent
oral motion for 5(k)1.1 departure is denied. It hasn’t been properly
substantiated.”442 At this point, the prosecutor filed the 5K1.1 motion,
prompting the judge to respond “the motion is filed and denied.”443 In
concluding that the prosecutor had not breached the plea agreement,
the court found the last-minute filing was “probably imprudent under
the circumstances” but “did not undermine the recommendation that
the government made to the court.”444
Some courts have even found that a prosecutor does not need to
make any oral recommendation at a sentencing hearing. In United
States v. Cates,445 Edward Cates agreed to plead guilty to one count of
wire fraud and four counts of bank robbery in exchange for the
prosecutor promising to “recommend at sentencing” a ten-year cap
on any sentence.446 At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor did not
orally make this recommendation and impliedly argued for a “strict,
yet indeterminate, term of imprisonment” by telling the judge:
It seems to me that Mr. Cates has in his head, in the words of
Auden, “I like committing crimes. It seems the system likes
forgiving them. Really, the world is admirably arranged.” . . .
[P]rotection of the public is probably the only consideration
that can be served at this stage.447
The Fifth Circuit found that the prosecutor’s actions did not
violate the plea agreement. While the prosecutor did not orally make
the promised recommendation, the court found “that the
recommended ten-year cap was prominently featured in all three
documents before the sentencing court”: the plea agreement, the
sentencing memorandum, and the presentence report.448 Further, with
regard to the prosecutor’s statement, the court concluded that, “[i]n
. . . light of Benchimol, we cannot hold that the government’s promise

440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.

Id. at 132.
Id. at 133.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 135 (quoting United States v. Hand, 913 F.2d 854, 857 (10th Cir. 1990)).
952 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 150, 153.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 153.
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in this case . . . precluded the prosecutor from arguing for a strict, yet
indeterminate, term of imprisonment.”449
Conversely, courts in a handful of states have placed a greater
obligation on prosecutors. For example, in State v. Wills,450 Daniel
Wills agreed to plead guilty to two counts of sexual misconduct in
exchange for the prosecutor dropping a third charge and
recommending “unified terms of fifteen years, with minimum periods
of confinement of three years.”451 At sentencing, the prosecutor
commented that “[w]hat he did to these two little ones is just
completely horrendous and almost unthinkable. And I think, at a very
minimum, he should get three years fixed followed by twelve
indeterminate for fifteen. I think the state is showing great restraint
by only recommending that sentence.”452
In deciding that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement, the
Supreme Court of Idaho noted Benchimol’s holding but found that
“Wills was entitled to have the prosecutor’s conduct conform to what
Wills reasonably understood to be the bargain.”453 The court then
cited Webster’s New International Dictionary, which “defines
‘recommend’ as ‘to mention or introduce as being worthy of
acceptance, use, or trial.’”454 According to the court, the prosecutor’s
comments did not endorse the agreement as one the judge should
accept and therefore violated that agreement.455
In its opinion in State v. Foster,456 the Court of Appeals of Kansas
reached the same result when the prosecutor simply said the
following at sentencing: “The State did agree to probation in this case
and that is our recommendation.”457 In making this conclusion, the
court cited to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and
found that it supported the conclusion that a prosecutor must take
special care to fulfill “any term of a plea agreement that has induced
the defendant to give up constitutionally protected rights and plead to
a crime.”458 Similarly, in State v. Lopez,459 the Supreme Court of Iowa
held that “[o]ur precedent makes clear the prosecutor must do more
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.

Id.
102 P.3d 380 (Idaho Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 381.
Id.
Id. at 383.
Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1897 (3d ed. 1993)).
Id.
180 P.3d 1074 (Kan. 2008).
Id. at 1076, 1077.
Id. at 1079.
872 N.W.2d 159 (Iowa 2015).
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than merely recite the plea recommendation; the prosecutor must
‘indicate to the court that the recommended sentence[] [is] supported
by the State and worthy of the court’s acceptance.’”460
b.

The Duty to Cooperate and Not to Hinder

As noted previously, section 205 of the Second Restatement of
Contracts defines the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.461 Comment d to section 205 states that
bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair
dealing may require more than honesty. A complete catalogue
of types of bad faith is impossible, but the following types are
among those which have been recognized in judicial decisions:
evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and
slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse
of a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to
cooperate in the other party’s performance.462
Courts have interpreted this comment and the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing to encompass both the duty to
cooperate and the duty not to hinder. As the Court of Federal Claims
noted in Tecom, Inc. v. United States,463 “while ‘[t]he implied duties to
cooperate and not to hinder are two separate, albeit related, implied
duties,’ they appear to be ‘disparate aspects’ of the overarching duty
of good faith and fair dealing.”464
The duty not to hinder is the obligation not to willfully or
negligently interfere with the other party’s performance of the
contract.465 This duty exists “because it is rarely possible to anticipate
in contract language every possible action or omission by a party that
undermines the bargain.”466 For instance, in Local America Bank of
Tulsa v. United States,467 the Court of Federal Claims found that
Congress breached the duty not to hinder by repealing a tax

460. Id. at 179 (quoting State v. Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 211, 216 (Iowa 2008)).
461. See supra text accompanying note 170.
462. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
463. 66 Fed. Cl. 736 (2005).
464. Id. at 769 (citations omitted) (first quoting Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v.
United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 35, 59 n.31 (2001); and then quoting Walter Dawgie Ski Corp. v.
United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 115, 130 (1993)).
465. Id. at 770 (quoting Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 726, 731
(Ct. Cl. 1957)).
466. Metcalf Constr. Co. v. United States, 742 F.3d 984, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
467. 52 Fed. Cl. 184 (2002).
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deduction that a bank planned to use after contracting with the
government to take over failing savings and loan institutions.468
The duty to cooperate supplements this duty not to hinder and
requires that the government do whatever is necessary to enable the
contractor to perform.469 Courts have found that the government
violates the duty to cooperate by engaging in behavior such as
responding to a contractor’s requests in an evasive or untimely
manner or failing to provide reasonable assistance at a contractor’s
request.470 For example, in D’Andrea Bros. LLC v. United States,471 a
contractor entered into an agreement with the United States Army
Natick Soldier Research, Development, and Engineering Center
(“Natick”) to commercialize energy bars called “HooAH! Bars” that
had been developed by Natick and were included in the operational
rations provided to soldiers.472 The contract stated that Natick would
help the contractor test and improve the bar.473
Natick complied with the express terms of the contract but also
“bad mouthed” the contractor and developed “its own bar within the
military feeding community.”474 The Court of Federal Claims,
however, rejected the contractor’s claim that Natick violated the duty
not to hinder because (1) this “bad mouthing” was only done
internally with military personnel and (2) Natick did not produce its
new bar for the commercial market.475
Conversely, the court found that Natick did fail “to cooperate
with [the contractor] during a significant period of the [contract]
term” by (1) changing the internal name of the HooAh! Bar to the
“First Strike” bar and (2) failing to communicate with the contractor
through their “key contacts” for a period of months.476 According to
the court, “the government’s actions destroyed plaintiff’s reasonable
expectation that the parties would work cooperatively to develop and
commercialize the HooAH! energy bar that would be the same or

468. Id. at 185, 191–92.
469. See Axion Corp. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 99, 120–21 (2007) (quoting Orlosky
Inc. v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 296, 311 (2005)).
470. Tecom, Inc., 66 Fed. Cl. at 770; see, e.g., Lewis-Nicholson, Inc. v. United States,
550 F.2d 26, 32 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (finding that the Bureau of Public Roads breached the duty
to cooperate by not accommodating a contractor’s accelerated performance to ensure
completion of a project before winter weather).
471. 109 Fed. Cl. 243 (2013).
472. Id. at 246–47.
473. Id. at 247.
474. Id. at 250–52, 255.
475. Id. at 260 n.15.
476. Id. at 247, 259–61.
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similar to the bars available in military rations.”477 Therefore, the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing covers the affirmative
duty to cooperate in addition to the duty not to hinder.
c. Applying the Implied Covenant to Presentation of Sentencing
Recommendations
The foregoing analysis makes clear that the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in the government contract context
contains both “the affirmative duty to cooperate . . . and the negative
obligation not to hinder or delay performance” by engaging in
conduct that undermines the bargain.478 Under Benchimol and its
progeny, courts have applied the duty not to hinder to plea
agreements by concluding that a prosecutor cannot express personal
reservations about plea agreements in a way that undermines her
promised sentencing recommendation.479
Arguably, however, the vast majority of courts have not applied
the duty to cooperate in the plea-bargaining context. Since
Benchimol, most courts have rejected claims that a prosecutor can
breach a plea agreement based upon behavior such as offering tepid
support for a sentencing recommendation, failing to provide the
reason(s) for the recommendation, and even conveying information
to the judge that could cause a harsher sentence.480
In D’Andrea, the Court of Federal Claims found that Natick
breached the duty to cooperate by failing to collaborate with a
contractor so that it could commercialize the HooAh! Bar in a
manner consistent with the contractor’s reasonable expectations.481
The comparable question in the plea-bargaining context is whether a
pleading defendant reasonably expects that the prosecutor will make
his sentencing recommendation “clear[] to the sentencing judge and
to express the justification for it.”482 While the Ninth Circuit majority
in Benchimol answered this question in the affirmative, the dissent
disagreed, concluding that neither the Federal Rules nor the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility imposes a duty of zeal on
prosecutors in “fulfilling a bargain, nor could they” because “[t]he

477. Id. at 260.
478. Universal Shelters of Am., Inc. v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 127, 145 (2009).
479. See supra text accompanying note 433.
480. See supra text accompanying notes 432–44.
481. See D’Andrea, 109 Fed. Cl. at 259–60.
482. United States v. Benchimol, 738 F.2d 1001, 1002 (9th Cir. 1984), rev’d, 471 U.S.
453 (1985).
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defendant is not the prosecutor’s client.”483 The Supreme Court later
agreed with the dissent’s reasoning, concluding that Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 did not suggest the implied-in-law
requirement that the prosecutor clearly make a sentencing
recommendation and express the justification for it.484
While the Benchimol Court was correct that Rule 11 does not
imply that prosecutors have specific obligations when making a
sentencing recommendation, it is important to note that the Due
Process Clause may require more than the Federal Rules. In its 1969
opinion in Boykin v. Alabama,485 the Supreme Court held that due
process requires that the record contain affirmative evidence that the
defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pleaded guilty
even though no such requirement existed in Rule 11.486 Subsequently,
Rule 11 was amended in 1974 to require judges to ensure that
defendants understand both the rights they are waiving by pleading
guilty and the consequences of guilty pleas.487 Courts across the
country have concluded that the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing applies to plea agreements, and this Article has argued
that this result is constitutionally required. If both of these premises
are correct, then courts should conclude that the Due Process Clause
obligates prosecutors to clearly make sentencing recommendations
and express the justifications for them.
Courts could reach this conclusion despite the fact that the
defendant is not the prosecutor’s client. After all, although the
defendant is not the prosecutor’s client, the Due Process Clause
obliges prosecutors to disclose material exculpatory evidence to
defendants, as does Model Rule of Professional Responsibility
3.8(d).488 Model Rule 3.8 covers “Special Responsibilities of a
Prosecutor.”489 Comment 1 to that Rule states in relevant part that
“[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific
obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice
. . . .”490

483. Id. at 1004 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
484. United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453, 455 (1985).
485. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
486. Id. at 242–44; see also McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464–67 (1969).
487. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to 1974 amendment (“The
amendment . . . codifies . . . the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama.”).
488. See supra text accompanying notes 309–12.
489. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
490. Id. at cmt. 1.
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Even though Rule 3.8 does not explicitly reference plea
agreements, courts have applied it to the plea-bargaining process. For
instance, the Supreme Court of South Dakota found that a prosecutor
violated Rule 3.8 by including a clause in a plea agreement “calling
for the public release of grand jury transcripts.”491 Meanwhile, the
Supreme Court of Kentucky used Rule 3.8 to conclude that a
prosecutor committed misconduct by including an ineffective
assistance of counsel waiver in a plea agreement.492 According to the
court, “[a] prosecutor is charged with ‘see[ing] that the defendant is
accorded procedural justice,’ and we simply do not believe the use of
IAC waivers lives up to that lofty expectation.”493 Similarly, in the
previously mentioned Foster case, the Court of Appeals of Kansas
concluded that a prosecutor must make clear that the recommended
sentence in a plea agreement is “worthy or desirable”494 because of
“the special duties and responsibilities of prosecutors, ‘whose interest
. . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done.’”495
While the obligations of Rule 3.8 are not constitutionally
required, there is a good argument under this Article’s thesis that the
implied covenant and the duty to cooperate should automatically
apply at sentencing hearings and require prosecutors to make
sentencing recommendations clearly and express the justifications for
them. Once again, in the absence of such an automatic application,
courts would need to consult the three Eldridge factors.
The same analysis applies here as applied in the substantial
assistance motion context: (1) defendants in both contexts have a
uniquely compelling interest in the accuracy of their criminal
proceedings, (2) the government’s countervailing interest in both
cases must be tempered by the interest in a fair and accurate
adjudication of criminal cases, and (3) defendants in both situations
face a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of their liberty that
can easily be remedied by requiring the prosecution to act in good
faith in presenting plea agreements at sentencing hearings. Moreover,
while review of a prosecutor’s failure to file a substantial assistance
491. In re Discipline of Russell, 797 N.W.2d 77, 82, 87–89 (S.D. 2011).
492. See United States ex rel. U.S. Attorneys for the E. & W. Dists. of Ky. v. Ky. Bar
Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136, 157 (Ky. 2014).
493. Id. (quoting KY. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.130(3.8) (Westlaw through May
2018 amendments)).
494. State v. Foster, 180 P.3d 1074, 1078–79 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (first quoting
Recommend, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1460 (4th ed. 2000); and then quoting
State v. Pabst, 996 P.2d 321, 328 (Kan. 2000)).
495. Id. at 1079 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
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motion requires fact-finding regarding the quality and quantity of the
defendant’s assistance, an appellate court would merely need to look
at the sentencing hearing record to decide whether a prosecutor made
a sentencing recommendation clearly and expressed the justifications
for it.
CONCLUSION
In his dissenting opinion in Ricketts v. Adamson, Justice Brennan
proposed the idea of plea agreements as constitutional contracts and
lamented the fact that the Supreme Court had not yet developed clear
rules of construction to apply in plea-bargaining disputes. This gap in
the law still exists thirty years later, despite ninety-five percent of
criminal cases being resolved by plea agreements. The Supreme
Court’s case law, however, makes clear that the Due Process Clause
applies to all parts of the plea-bargaining process and that pleading
defendants should be treated at least as well as parties to other
contracts. It is clear, however, that most courts treat defendants worse
in at least three key plea-bargaining scenarios: (1) substantial
assistance motions, (2) Brady disclosures, and (3) prosecutorial
presentation of sentencing recommendations. Under a theory of plea
agreements as constitutional contracts, courts should change the way
they handle these three scenarios to protect the due process rights of
pleading defendants.
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